The Cost of Avoidance: Pluralism, Neutrality, and the Foundations of Modern Legal Ethics by Mortazavi, Melissa
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 7
Fall 2014
The Cost of Avoidance: Pluralism, Neutrality, and
the Foundations of Modern Legal Ethics
Melissa Mortazavi
Brooklyn Law School
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melissa Mortazavi, The Cost of Avoidance: Pluralism, Neutrality, and the Foundations of Modern Legal Ethics, 42 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 151
(2017) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol42/iss1/7
THE COST OF AVOIDANCE:  
PLURALISM, NEUTRALITY, AND THE FOUNDATIONS  
OF MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 
MELISSA MORTAZAVI* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article offers an answer to key questions in modern American legal ethics: when 
and why did the legal profession stop talking about professional conduct in moral terms? 
Mining the history of current rules governing lawyer conduct, this Article reveals that while 
the 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility sought to revolutionize legal ethics by 
creating a professional code that was more transparent, democratized, and less hierarchical 
than the preceding 1908 Canons of Legal Ethics, that effort also excised a moral under-
standing of lawyering in order to facilitate a particular understanding of pluralism.  
 The drafters of the 1969 Model Code faced a difficult task. They recognized women and 
minorities were entering the legal profession in unprecedented numbers. Aware of impend-
ing conflicts within the newly diverse bar and unsure how to resolve them, drafters of the 
Model Code struck a devil’s bargain: in exchange for the peaceable coexistence of heterogene-
ous parties, the Model Code sought to remove moral disputes from the workplace by embrac-
ing neutral partisanship. This Article discusses the consequences of that choice. It argues 
that in order to permit one form of pluralism (demographic pluralism) the bar adopted a 
professional conduct system (neutral partisanship) that now impedes the inclusion of full 
substantive pluralism (including value pluralism).  
 Neutrality is not neutral. Avoidance has its costs. The Model Code did not actually re-
move morality from practice: it only prevented new lawyers from having the language and 
means to challenge and change existing moral norms in the profession. Modern legal ethics’ 
endorsement of neutral partisanship structurally impedes substantive discussions amongst 
students, lawyers, judges, and academics about proper ends and appropriate means. This 
Article is a call to reopen discussion as it reveals why the legal profession embraced this 
particular model of lawyering in the first place and how that purpose has been frustrated 
over time. 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................  152 
 II. THE CANONS OF ETHICS AND THE MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ................................................................................................  156 
 A. In the Beginning, the ABA Created the Canons ........................................  156 
 B. From Canons to Code: Operationalizing Theory .......................................  159 
 III. CODIFICATION AND STRUCTURE ........................................................................  163 
 A. Rules Adopted; Ethics Orphaned ...............................................................  164 
 B. Enforceability: The Model Code and Discipline ........................................  169 
 IV. STANDARDIZING THE STANDARD CONCEPTION ..................................................  170 
 A. Neutral Partisanship: A Primer ................................................................  171 
 B. A Modern Moral Justification of Neutral Partisanship ............................  174 
 C. Neutral Partisanship as a Vehicle for Client Autonomy ...........................  177 
1.   Candor, Loyalty, and Effective Client Service .....................................  178 
2.   Codifying Trust: The Model Code’s Bind .............................................  179 
3.   Clients and the Knowledge Deficit .......................................................  180 
                                                                                                                  
 * Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I would like to thank 
Anita Bernstein, W. Bradley Wendel, Nelson Tebbe, Russell Pearce, Bruce Green, Rebecca 
Roiphe, Stephen Lee, Alan Trammell, Emily Berman, Robin Effron, Sarah Cravens, and 
the faculty workshops at Berkeley Law, University of Arkansas School of Law, University 
of Oklahoma College of Law, and Brooklyn Law School for their comments on earlier drafts 
of this piece. Most of all, my deepest gratitude to Roger Michalski. 
152  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:151 
 
 
 D. Defining Neutrality and the Limits of Self: Diversity and Equality .........  182 
1.   No One Is Neutral: An Example ..........................................................  183 
2.   Racism Without Racists .......................................................................  185 
3.   The Model Code Decoded: Examples of Non-Neutral “Neutrality” ......  187 
4.   Day to Day Practice: Limited Lawyer’s Roles, Limited Lawyers and 
Their Clients ........................................................................................  192 
5.   Discussion, Dissent, and Homogeneity: The Value of Pluralism .........  193 
 V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  195 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 By the 1960s, the American Bar Association (ABA) could not re-
main impervious to the general social upheaval of the civil rights 
revolution.1 The legal profession was in flux2 and faced changes in its 
overall size and composition as a wave of new entrants from formerly 
excluded groups gained broader access to higher education and politi-
cal capital.3 Lawyers and legal regulators faced novel and vexing 
questions: How could the bar devise ethical standards to include the-
se newcomers, appeal to current members, and distance itself from 
                                                                                                                  
 1. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189, 1278-81, 1295 (1986) (dubbing the late 1960s and the early 1970s the ―Public 
Interest Era‖). The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment abolishing 
poll taxes, the Voting Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 were all newly minted. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1–2000h-6 
(2012); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2012); Civil Rights Act of 
1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 25, 
and 42 U.S.C.).  
 2. See Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal 
Ethics—II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 216 (2002) (―[T]he American 
legal profession is subject to the wheels of political and social fortune just like many other 
occupational groups.‖). 
 3. See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 284 (1989) (showing varying es-
timates of percentage of women law students in 1970, ranging from 2.8% to 5.1%); A.B.A., 
FIRST YEAR AND TOTAL J.D. ENROLLMENT BY GENDER, 1947-2011, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissi
ons_to_the_bar/statistics/jd_enrollment_1yr_total_gender.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2015) (noting that in 1960, women accounted for 3.4% of total J.D. enrollment, and 
by the late 1970s, that number rose significantly to 30.8%, which marks an 806% increase 
in the percentage of women enrolled in J.D. programs over a period of less than twenty 
years); SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A.B.A., LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE 
ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 13-27 (1992) [hereinafter 
ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION] (describing a rapid diversification of the bar throughout the 
1960s in terms of race and gender); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 222 (―Prior to the 1970s, 
various aspects of the legal profession had seen little change, including (1) the profession‘s 
size, (2) its percentages of men (very large) and women (minute) lawyers, (3) its racial com-
position (predominantly white), (4) the size of law firms, (5) the number of law schools and 
the size of the law student population, (6) the incomes of lawyers relative to other occupa-
tional groups, and (7) the constrained conditions for competition within the legal profes-
sion.‖); see also Jonathan D. Glater, Women Are Close to Being Majority of Law Students, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2001, at A1 (reporting new ABA figures showing 49.4% women 
among 2000-01 law students, with more women than men applying for 2001-02). 
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its exclusionary past?4 What moral views regarding the role of law-
yers and hot-button topics like civil disobedience would female or mi-
nority attorneys hold?5 And if they did have different views than the 
existing bar, ―whose conscience and whose ethical standards [we]re to 
control?‖6  
 The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) 
was the bar‘s answer to these questions.7 In it, the bar laid out pro-
fessional principles to govern lawyers in an ―urbanized society‖8 and 
break with the dated and elitist 1908 Canons of Ethics.9 This was no 
easy task. The mechanics of a new, more inclusive system of profes-
sional conduct were not obvious. Faced with moral and demographic 
pluralism at the bar and unwilling or unable to negotiate it, the 
drafters of the Model Code struck a devil‘s bargain; in exchange for 
                                                                                                                  
 4. Charles W. Wolfram, Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Eth-
ics—I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 485 (2001) (―[T]he ABA until well into the 
twentieth century functioned mainly as an exclusive social fraternal organization of high-
status lawyers rather than as a broadly representative and unofficial regulatory body.‖). 
 5. See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. Much of the established bar viewed 
civil disobedience skeptically, while newer entrants may have supported opposition of un-
just laws through civil disobedience. In the view of the existing bar, lawyers had no role in 
fomenting disobedience of established laws, even if these laws were oppressive, for lawyers 
instead ought to work through established legal channels to effectuate change. See, for 
example, 111 CONG. REC. 15103 (1965), in which one of the leading legal ethics reformers—
in an address originally given to the Tennessee Bar Association on June 17, 1965, intro-
duced into the record by Strom Thurmond—warned of civil disobedience‘s ability to ―seri-
ously threaten the breakdown of law, order, and morality‖ and called for ―impartial, even-
handed, vigorous, swift and certain enforcement of our criminal laws, and the real and 
substantial punishment thereunder of all conduct that violates those laws.‖ See also id. 
(arguing that ―[n]o ‗end‘ . . . however worthy [can ever] justify resort to unlawful means‖ 
and that ―America needs a genuine revival of respect for law and orderly process . . . a new 
impatience with those who violate and circumvent the laws, and a determined insistence 
that laws be enforced‖ (alterations in original)).   
 6. John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsi-
bility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255, 260 (1970) (official reporter for the Model Code 
explaining the reasons that supported the Code‘s development).  
 7. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1259 
(1991) (―[R]adical changes occurring in the profession weakened the traditional bar‘s con-
ception of itself, which in turn enhanced the bar‘s difficulties in dealing with the fact that 
its norms were becoming public law.‖); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 210 (―[S]tresses within 
our society . . . affected American law and the American legal profession. These stresses 
created a fertile ground for legal change to occur and appear to have combined as its trig-
gering force.‖). See generally Chris G. McDonough & Michael L. Epstein, Regulating Attor-
ney Conduct: Specific Statutory Schemes v. General Regulatory Guidelines, 11 TOURO L. 
REV. 609, 610-11 (1995); Fred C. Zacharias, Foreword: The Quest for a Perfect Code, 11 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787 (1998).  
 8. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980); see also Edward L. 
Wright, Study of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 11 CATH. LAW 323, 323 (1965) (―[T]he 
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association need revision [be-
cause] . . . changing conditions in an urbanized society require new statements of profes-
sional responsibility.‖). 
 9. See infra notes 23-28.  
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the peaceable coexistence of heterogeneous parties, they excised dis-
cussions of morality from the workplace.  
 This Article discusses the consequences of that choice. It argues 
that in order to facilitate one form of pluralism (demographic plural-
ism) the bar adopted a professional conduct system (neutral parti-
sanship) that now impedes the inclusion of full substantive pluralism 
(including value pluralism). It did so by creating a set of national dis-
ciplinary rules that removed discussions of morality from profession-
al discourse.10 Those rules incorporated, strengthened, and opera-
tionalized previous loose commitments to a client-centric model of 
lawyering now known as ―neutral partisanship.‖11 Just as color-
blindness became the new hegemonic paradigm elsewhere, the legal 
profession adopted its own sanitized regime for regulating a diverse 
bar and avoiding conflict through the neutral-partisan model.  
 However, neutrality is not neutral. Avoidance has its costs. Mod-
ern legal ethics‘ endorsement of neutral partisanship structurally 
impedes meaningful discussions amongst students, lawyers, judges, 
and academics about proper ends and appropriate means. The Model 
Code did not succeed in removing morality from standards of prac-
tice; it only prevented new lawyers from developing the language and 
means to challenge and modify existing moral norms in place. The 
Model Code set a certain moral vision of legal professionalism: law-
yers were not expected to be any more than legal technicians, ful-
filling clients‘ ends. Certain skills were prioritized, others cast aside. 
A lawyer‘s moral contemplation, empowerment, or even responsibil-
ity was rendered officially optional. As a result, today‘s legal profes-
                                                                                                                  
 10. See, e.g., Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History 
and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 10 (1970) (chairman of the drafting committee noting 
that ―[t]he division [between issues concerning morals versus issues requiring disciplinary 
action] is one that has not previously been generally made‖ in legal ethics and that ―[o]ne of 
the weaknesses of the Canons of Professional Ethics was its failure to speak to the two 
forces separately‖); Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242, 1244 n.4 (Miss. 1991) (―Our rules 
regulating professional conduct have evolved from canons to ethical considerations and 
now to a code quite like unto a criminal code.‖). 
 11. Neutral partisanship is the idea that lawyers are not accountable for the morality 
of their client‘s chosen ends (hence neutrality) and yet act as a partisan in favor of their 
client‘s interests (by providing representation that argues on their client‘s behalf). This 
concept has many attendant names including ―amoral lawyering‖ or ―role morality‖ and 
―role differentiation,‖ since the role of being a lawyer is viewed as morally distinct from 
actions taken on from the ―role‖ of being a private citizen. See Stephen L. Pepper, The 
Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 613 (using the term amoral lawyering model due to the distance of the law-
yer‘s moral accountability for client outcomes); Norman W. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in 
Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1377, 1378 (defining 
role morality as ―the idea, much maligned by legal ethicists, that lawyers should receive 
some degree of immunity from the general requirements of conscience on account of their 
distinctive social role‖). 
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sion suffers from a self-imposed inability to talk about morality or 
fundamental differences in the workplace.  
 Equally troubling, this neutral-partisan ideal renders all lawyers 
interchangeable widgets, as the bulk of what makes lawyers individ-
uals is deemed professionally irrelevant, worthless, and even inap-
propriate. Neutral partisanship is the dominant moral fiction where 
all people are expected to behave the same way, and that singular 
way of acting is deemed ―neutral‖—although, in reality, it is not.  
 This Article tells the story of how and why neutral partisanship 
became the dominant norm for modern lawyering and argues that 
while such ―neutrality‖ may have at one time served the purpose 
supporting pluralism at the bar, today it has outlived its utility. Part 
II begins by laying out how the bar came to pursue demographic plu-
ralism in drafting the Model Code and why the adoption of neutral 
partisanship became a vital part of that process. Part III discusses 
how the Model Code set up a system that solidified a commitment to 
neutral partisanship by divorcing morality from mandatory rules 
governing professional conduct. Finally, Part IV explains how neutral 
partisanship actually impedes a full understanding of pluralism 
which includes value pluralism. It does so by critiquing 1) the argu-
ment that neutral partisanship placed the power in the hands of the 
clients (the people) over ―elitist‖ lawyers and 2) the idea that neutral 
partisanship itself is (or can be) value neutral. 
 I conclude that the Model Code has failed to serve the very values 
that it sought to facilitate: broad conceptions of pluralism.12 As such, 
the ongoing disenfranchisement of discussions of morality in modern 
professional discourse cannot be justified on those terms. However, 
by recognizing the historically contingent normative commitments 
embedded in modern legal ethics, the bar and the academy can work 
towards revitalizing legal ethics so that it becomes a tool for the 
modern bar, not a hindrance to it. 
                                                                                                                  
 12. Current norms, rules, and regulations governing lawyers today exist because of 
the shift in legal ethics from a treatise-style discussion of professionalism to a statute-like 
structure that polices the conduct of lawyers—a shift that occurred with the advent of the 
Model Code. See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Lawyers’ Responsibilities and Lawyers’ 
Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1582 (1994) (―Unlike the Canons, the Model Code pro-
vided specific and legally binding normative rules, thus ‗legalizing‘ substantive professional 
regulation.‖); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1251 (―In retrospect, it is clear that the crucial step 
in the ‗legalization‘ process occurred in the change from the 1908 Canons to the 1970 Code, 
rather than from the Code to the 1983 Rules. It was the Code that first embraced legally 
binding norms in the form of the Disciplinary Rules . . . .‖). 
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II.   THE CANONS OF ETHICS AND THE MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A.   In the Beginning, the ABA Created the Canons  
 In the United States, the history of attempts to formalize legal 
ethics into a national document is concise.13 In part in response to the 
American Medical Association‘s adoption of a professional code of 
ethics, as well as concern over excessive ―commercialism‖ in law 
practice,14 the ABA15 created an advisory ethics committee in 1905.16 
The Committee‘s work culminated in a draft ethics proposal entitled 
the ―Canons of Professional Ethics‖ (Canons).17 George Sharswood‘s 
1854 essay, ―An Essay on Professional Ethics,‖ was of particular im-
portance as it was reprinted and circulated to all ABA members with 
the draft Canons.18 The ABA membership ultimately adopted these 
Canons officially in 1908.19  
 The Canons were brief, containing only thirty-two guidelines, and 
were written in broad terms. They read more like a treatise or essay 
                                                                                                                  
 13. This is not to say, however, that no rules governed lawyer behavior prior to this 
time. Rather, the common law, in connection with norms of practice and homogeneity in 
the group of people trained in law, provided guidance on improper conduct. 
 14. Commercialism was code for opposition to the emergence of working class lawyers 
who served immigrants, the urban poor, and blue-collar workers. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, 
UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 41-43 (1976). 
 15. At the turn of the century membership in the ABA was by invitation only and 
limited to a small but highly influential percentage of the overall lawyer population. See 
JAMES E. MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND 
RESPONSES TO CHANGE 10 (2013).  
 16. Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 
1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 7-8 (1999) (―[L]aw journals at the turn of the cen-
tury were replete with articles lamenting growing ‗commercialism‘ in law practice . . . .‖). 
 17. David R. Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical Responsibilities: A History, 
in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 29, 37 (Michael Davis & Frederick A. Elliston eds., 
1986). The Canons borrowed doctrinally from the ethics rules of Alabama, as well as the 
works of George Sharswood and David Hoffman upon which the Alabama Code of Ethics 
was based. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 11 (7th ed. 2000) (discussing how Professor Sharswood‘s work 
was influenced by David Hoffman‘s 1836 publication Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Profes-
sional Development); Carle, supra note 16, at 9 (relaying how the drafters of the Canons 
consulted Hoffman and Sharswood in addition to existing state codes, particularly that of 
Alabama); Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Ala-
bama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 507 (1998) (discussing the role the Ala-
bama Code served as a model for the original Canons).  
 18. Final Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, 33 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 
567, 568 (1908) [hereinafter Final Report]; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF LAWYERING 14-15 (4th ed. 2005); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering 
the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 243 (1992). 
 19. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND 
STANDARDS 617 (2008). 
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than a rulebook.20 The Canons‘ lofty tone was often distinctly moral 
in nature, concluding that a lawyer finds his ―highest honor in a de-
served reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as 
an honest man and a patriotic citizen,‖ not exclusively in the service 
of a client.21  
 The level of generality of the Canons‘ wording did not prevent it 
from becoming canonical quickly, in the sense of being widely adopt-
ed and influential.22 Although the ABA had (and has) no authority 
over the various state bars, over time the Canons were formally or 
informally adopted in most states through either direct bar or court 
action.23 Over the next sixty years, the ABA added only fifteen provi-
sions to the Canons.24 Thus, the original 1908 Canons remained 
largely intact and central to governing legal practice in the United 
States well into the early 1970s.25 
Critiques of the Canons were strong and mounting by the 1960s.26 
In 1958, the ABA Joint Conference had submitted an ethics report 
penned in large part by Lon Fuller, a celebrated ethics scholar, flag-
ging the need to revisit the Canons. He noted that ―[t]oday the lawyer 
plays a changing and increasingly varied role. In many developing 
fields the precise contribution of the legal profession is as yet unde-
fined.‖27 For some, concerns focused on the lack of specificity and en-
                                                                                                                  
 20. See generally Final Report, supra note 18, at 575-85. 
 21. Id. at 584. 
 22. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 23-26 (1953); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, cmt. b (2000) (noting how states differed in treating the 
Canons as mandatory rules or nonbinding guidance for proper conduct); Papke, supra note 
17, at 39 (noting how three-fourths of all states had adopted the Canons by the beginning 
of World War I). 
 23. But note, bar adoption is not necessarily coterminous with a consensus of support 
from practicing lawyers. Some scholars have noted that participation in bar associations is 
partially the purview of economic privilege, as time spent on bar associations necessarily 
cuts into time spent on billable or paying matters. See Papke, supra note 17, at 36 (―Coun-
try lawyers could rise to prominence in the bar associations of rural states, but in general 
urban lawyers, with the resources and types of practices that could facilitate convention-
eering and organized bar work, were the leaders of the bar associations.‖). 
 24. Canons 33-45 were adopted at the ABA‘s annual meeting in 1928. See Proceed-
ings, 51 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 29, 130 (1928). Canon 46, regarding advertisement of specialized 
legal services, was adopted at the ABA‘s annual meeting in 1933. See Proceedings, 56 ANN. 
REP. A.B.A. 41, 178, 429 (1933). Canon 47, regarding conduct that aids the unauthorized 
practice of law, was adopted on September 30, 1937. See Supplemental Report of the Stand-
ing Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 62 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 761, 767 (1937). 
 25. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW & ETHICS 11 
(9th ed. 2012). 
 26. See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the 
Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958) (seminal report calling for reform of the 
Canon-based system). 
 27. Id. at 1159. 
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forceability in the Canons.28 In keeping with the distributive justice 
sentiments of the time, others critiqued the profession‘s failure to 
serve underrepresented groups of the American population.29 Some 
highlighted the darker undertones of the Canons‘ naissance, arguing 
that it functioned as a gatekeeper to keep ethnic minorities and 
women from gaining upward mobility as lawyers and serving low in-
come and immigrant communities.30 The Canons were also suscepti-
ble to critique as maintaining the landed gentry‘s exclusivity of the 
bar.31 With general, ambiguous language and limitations on advertis-
ing, fees, and client development, the Canons were a natural poster 
child for the established bar‘s elitism and distance from less well-
connected lawyers and clients.32  
 These internal and external concerns finally came to a head in 
1964. That year, the ABA president, and future Justice, Lewis F. 
Powell Jr., convened a ―Special Committee on the Evaluation of Ethi-
cal Standards‖ (known as the ―Wright Committee‖) to propose 
amendments to the existing Canons.33 Originally, the Wright Com-
mittee convened with the purpose of recommending revisions to the 
                                                                                                                  
 28. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980) (listing among the 
shortcomings to the Canons that ―most of the Canons did not lend themselves to practical 
sanction for violations‖); 58 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 94-95 (1935) (arguing that the Canons offer 
little concrete guidance and suggesting ―a Code of Practice which will deal not with general 
principles but with the specific abuses involved‖); John F. Sutton, Jr., Guidelines to Profes-
sional Responsibility, 39 TEX. L. REV. 391, 422-23 (1961) (arguing that the Canons are in-
sufficiently specific to set a reasonable minimum standard); Wright, supra note 10, at 4  
(quoting a 1958 American Bar Foundation report stating that the Canons do not present 
―sufficient detail‖ in dealing with ―specific situations encountered in actual practice‖). 
 29. See Papke, supra note 17, at 38, 41. See generally Wolfram supra note 4, at 485 
(―[T]he ABA until well into the twentieth century functioned mainly as an exclusive social 
fraternal organization of high-status lawyers rather than as a broadly representative and 
unofficial regulatory body.‖). 
 30. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 14, at 43-130; RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF 
REFORM 157 (1955). 
 31. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1250 (―The Canons . . . expressed the viewpoint of an 
economically advantaged social stratum distinguished by its intellectual accomplishment, 
attachment to the business community, and preoccupation with civic political affairs.‖); 
Papke, supra note 17, at 38 (discussing disproportionate effects of the Canons, particularly 
limitations of expertise claims and advertising, on solo practitioners who serviced working 
class people). See generally Harry Cohen, Ambivalence Affecting Modern American Law 
Practice, 18 ALA. L. REV. 31, 31 (1965) (―Many rules and principles which purport to guide 
professional conduct today are based on the premise that the American lawyer is in the 
same economic and professional environment as his predecessors who practiced in the nine-
teenth century or as barristers in the English system.‖); Donald T. Weckstein, A Re-Evaluation 
of the Canons of Professional Ethics—Evaluated, 33 TENN. L. REV. 176, 180 (1966).  
 32. See Carle, supra note 16, at 16 (noting that all fourteen final committee members 
were members of the ―social and economic elite of the profession‖ and were exclusively 
white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant). 
 33. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 19, at 617-18; HAZARD ET AL., supra note 18, at 14.  
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existing Canons.34 However, attempts to reword the Canons ―became 
an extended search for the full meaning of professional responsibility 
in the context of modern day society, a search that culminated in the 
formulation of the [Model] Code.‖35 As such, the Committee began a 
multi-year journey of deliberations that eventually resulted in the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.  
B.   From Canons to Code: Operationalizing Theory 
 Wright Committee members were mindful of the political climate 
and contemporary changes facing the legal profession.36 As the pref-
ace to the Model Code makes explicit, the Model Code was drafted in 
direct response to contemporary practice.37 It noted that the ―changed 
and changing conditions in our legal system and urbanized society 
require new statements of professional principles.‖38 New de-
mographics of people were joining or about to join the profession in 
force.39 The ―[r]ecruitment into the profession was affected by pro-
grams reaching out to racial minorities and women, whose assimila-
tion into law practice became both a norm of public policy and a legal 
duty.‖40 The profession was also growing quickly in size, partially in 
response to the expansion of the administrative state.41 The Commit-
tee was aware of the urgency behind the need to adapt. It empha-
sized this in the Code:  
                                                                                                                  
 34. See Wright, supra note 10, at 5 (―A completely changed document was not 
envisioned.‖). 
 35. Id. at 6. 
 36. The chair of the Committee, Edward L. Wright, stated that the Model Code was a 
―substantial improvement‖ over the Canons precisely because ―it is the result of a thorough 
review of the functions of lawyers in modern-day society.‖ Id. at 17.  
 37. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. n.5 (1980) (― ‗The law and its insti-
tutions change as social conditions change. They must change if they are to preserve, much 
less advance, the political and social values from which they derive their purpose and their 
life. This is true of the most important of legal institutions, the profession of law. The pro-
fession, too, must change when conditions change in order to preserve and advance the 
social values that are its reasons for being.‘ ‖ (quoting Elliott E. Cheatham, Availability of 
Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and the Organized Bar, 12 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438, 440 (1965))). 
 38. Id. at Preface. 
 39. See, e.g., ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 3 (describing a rapid diversification 
of the bar throughout the 1960s in terms of race and gender); ELIZABETH CHAMBLISS, 
MILES TO GO: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, A.B.A. COMM. ON 
RACIAL & ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2004). Cf. Beverly Balos, Confer-
ring on the MacCrate Report: A Clinical Gaze, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 349, 361 (1994) (noting 
that the MacCrate report overlooked disabled and homosexual lawyers). 
 40. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1259. 
 41. See BARBARA A. CURRAN, WOMEN IN THE LAW: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS 8-9 (1995) 
(noting that because of a steep increase in total numbers of law students, increased per-
centages of women law students did not displace male students in the total number of law 
jobs available to them); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1259 n.109. 
160  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:151 
 
 
The advances in natural science and technology are so startling 
and the velocity of change in business and in social life is so great 
that the law along with the other social sciences, and even human 
life itself, is in grave danger of being extinguished by new gods of 
its own invention if it does not awake from its lethargy.42 
 The extent to which societal shifts were on the minds of the draft-
ers of the Code is evident in the Model Code‘s multiple references to 
evaluating lawyer‘s roles in response to historical context and fluid 
circumstances.43 The preamble of the Model Code also reminded law-
yers that ―a lawyer must with courage and foresight be able and 
ready to shape the body of the law to the ever-changing relationships 
of society.‖ 44 Acknowledging the momentous changes in society, the 
Code identifies the difficulties this places on the bar itself: 
 Changing times produce changes in our laws and legal  
procedures. . . . 
 We have undergone enormous changes in the last fifty years 
within the lives of most of the adults living today who may be 
seeking advice. Most of these changes have been accompanied by 
changes and developments in the law . . . . Every practicing lawyer 
encounters these problems and is often perplexed with his own in-
ability to keep up, not only with changes in the law, but also with 
changes in the lives of his clients and their legal problems.45 
 Thus, mindful of the need to transform and the social pressures at 
play in an ―urbanized society,‖46 the Wright Committee embarked on 
drafting a Model Code that met these needs, yet was ―designed to be 
acceptable to the profession‖ as it currently stood.47 The Wright 
Committee itself was hardly an anti-establishment group.48 Although 
the Committee chair, Edward L. Wright, noted that the twelve mem-
bers of the Committee represented ―a broad spectrum of the profes-
                                                                                                                  
 42. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-1 n.1 (1980). 
 43. See, e.g., id. at EC 2-7 (―Changed conditions, however, have seriously restricted 
the effectiveness of the traditional [attorney] selection process.‖); id. at EC 2-10 (―Because 
technological change is a recurrent feature of communications forms, and because percep-
tions of what is relevant in lawyer selection may change, lawyer advertising regulations 
should not be cast in rigid, unchangeable terms.‖); id. at EC 8-1 (―Changes in human af-
fairs and imperfections in human institutions make necessary constant efforts to maintain 
and improve our legal system.‖).  
 44. See id. at Pmbl.  
 45. Id. at EC 6-1 n.1 (internal quotations omitted). 
 46. Id. at Preface. 
 47. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1252. 
 48. See Wright, supra note 10, at 2 nn.1-3 (listing Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., John 
Ritchie, A. James Casner, Slyvester C. Smith, Glenn M. Coulter, John G. Weinmann, E. 
Smythe Gambrell, Sherman Welpton, Jr., Benton E. Gates, Charles E. Whittaker, William 
H. Morrison, and Edward L. Wright).  
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sion,‖ others might categorize it as a fairly narrow slice of society re-
flecting the traditional demographics of the profession.49 The Com-
mittee included the Associate Dean of Harvard Law School,50 the 
Dean of Northwestern Law School,51 one former Supreme Court Jus-
tice,52 and nine current practitioners in private practice (including 
two former ABA presidents).53 Wright himself was a lawyer from pri-
vate practice in Arkansas where he was a longtime active member of 
the ABA, a leader of the American College of Trial Attorneys, and a 
prospective future president of the ABA.54 He was known for being 
―outwardly conventional—indeed formal—in dress, conversation, and 
deportment.‖55 The Committee did not include women or members of 
minority racial or ethnic groups. The Wright Committee‘s member-
ship is notable as the process of drafting the rules was private; the 
Committee deliberated in closed meetings, no interim drafts were 
published or circulated, and no hearings were held.56 During the final 
years of the process, a young female attorney acted as an assistant 
reporter to the Committee, but there is no indication that she was 
consulted for substantive input.57  
 The Wright Committee faced unique challenges. Unlike the draft-
ers of the Canons in 1908 who were drafting rules for a comparative-
ly homogenous membership, the Wright Committee was crafting 
rules for an increasingly diverse group of lawyers. The drafters likely 
did not share many personal connections or common experiences 
with these new entrants.58 Recognizing that there would be multiple 
views of what is moral conduct in the emerging bar, ―the issue quick-
ly becomes, whose conscience and whose ethical standards are to con-
                                                                                                                  
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. at 2 n.3.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 2 n.1. 
 53. Id. at 2 n.4. Notably, Gambrell founded the Legal Aid Society of Atlanta. Genesee 
County Bar Program Wins ABA Professionalism Award, 79 MICH. B.J. 1159, 1180 (2000). 
 54. See Wright, supra note 10, at 2. 
 55. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1252. 
 56. See id. at 1253. 
 57. John F. Sutton, a University of Texas law professor and former chairman of the 
Texas State Ethics Committee, acted as the official reporter. For the last two years of the 
process, Sutton was assisted by a recent University of Texas School of Law graduate, a 
young woman who came to take a very active role in the civil right struggle as the lead 
counsel in Roe v. Wade, Ms. Sarah Weddington. See Wright, supra note 10, at 2-3. Wed-
dington also actively aided chairman Wright in publications related to the Code. Id. 
 58. As such, the disciplinary rules ―functioned as a statute defining the legal contours 
of a vocation whose practitioners were connected primarily by having been licensed to prac-
tice law.‖ Hazard, supra note 7, at 1251. 
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trol?‖59 Unable or unwilling to engage this question, the Wright 
Committee devised an alternative to direct confrontation: it created a 
system to ignore such differences and attempt to insulate the work-
place from value pluralism. Specifically, the drafters of the Model 
Code (1) separated ethical considerations from a ―floor‖ of acceptable 
conduct (known as disciplinary rules), thereby removing any manda-
tory discussion of morality (as opposed to legality) from general dis-
course or debate on the bar level, and (2) strengthened and opera-
tionalized a commitment to neutral partisanship that facilitated the 
removal from the workplace of lawyers‘ identities as people with 
moral viewpoints.60  
 The Committee‘s work culminated in a draft of the Model Code 
that was approved by the ABA House of Delegates in the summer of 
1969 and went into effect in 1970.61 The Model Code was a significant 
structural departure from the Canons: it was regulatory in nature 
and bifurcated for the first time rules from ethical considerations.62 
Instead of a prosaic format, the Wright Committee structured the 
Model Code in statutory-style tiers. The Code grouped rules accord-
ing to nine ―Canons.‖ that ―are basic to the proper functioning of the 
legal profession in modern society.‖63 Each Canon had a one-
sentence-long overarching statement that began with the discretion-
ary qualifier ―A lawyer should‖ and then proceeded to a statement 
such as ―assist in preventing the unauthorized practice of law‖ or 
―assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal pro-
fession.‖64 Following each of the header-style Canons were binding 
mandatory ―Disciplinary Rules‖ (DRs)—created, as their name sug-
gests,  to discipline65—and accompanying, non-binding ―aspirational‖ 
―Ethical Considerations‖ (ECs) that were provided for guidance.66  
                                                                                                                  
 59. Sutton, supra note 6, at 260 (official reporter for the Code writing on reasons sup-
porting the Code‘s development).  
 60. In drafting the Model Code, the Committee deliberately sought ―a complete sepa-
ration . . . between the inspirational and the proscriptive,‖ which they viewed as a ―sub-
stantial improvement.‖ Wright, supra note 10, 17; see also Sutton, supra note 6 , at 260 
(―The creation of the ethical considerations-disciplinary rules bifurcation ends the struc-
tural difficulty. Now it can be stated that the law providing specific, authoritative stand-
ards for the advocate includes the disciplinary rules.‖). 
 61. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 19, at 617. 
 62. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 46 (3d ed. 2012); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1249-60; Sutton, supra note 6, at 258. 
 63. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Table of Contents (1980). 
 64. Id. at Canon 1, 3. 
 65. See Sutton, supra note 6, at 258.  
 66. Id. (stating that ethical considerations ―are designed to ‗appeal to the reason and 
understanding of the lawyer‘ and to give guidance in those areas in which the lawyer is 
free to exercise his own conscience without compulsion of law‖ (quoting John F. Sutton, Jr., 
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 The Model Code quickly became the default measure of attorney 
misconduct in federal courts; within a year of being presented to the 
ABA, seventeen states had adopted the Model Code, and the large 
majority of remaining states soon fell in line.67  
 Reformers heralded the Model Code as a moderate victory.68 In 
retrospect, the Model Code that emerged in 1969 has been viewed as 
an improvement from the preceding Canons.69 To many commenta-
tors then and now, the Model Code facilitated modern practice and 
the diversifying demographic composition of the bar by increasing 
transparency, modifying rules to allow more flexibility regarding re-
ferrals and advertising,70 and discussing a commitment to pro bono 
work.71 The overall tone of the Model Code, particularly the pream-
ble, echoed with civic aspirations.72 The Model Code remained at play 
until the mid-eighties when its replacement, the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, was adopted by the ABA and eventually most 
states.73 The Model Rules, like the Model Code before it, are code-
like, legally enforceable, and also set a baseline of lawyer conduct 
grounded in neutral partisanship.  
III.   CODIFICATION AND STRUCTURE 
 The advent of the Model Code was a watershed moment for Amer-
ican legal ethics. With it, the American bar eschewed a duty to en-
gage in broad discussions of the lawyer‘s moral role in civil society for 
a limited inquiry into what the proper regulatory rules should be to 
                                                                                                                  
Re-evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Reviser’s Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 
132, 133 (1966))).  
 67. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 46; Wright, supra note 10, at 1.  
 68. See Papke, supra note 17, at 43. See generally Sarah Ragle Weddington, A Fresh 
Approach to Preserving Independent Judgment—Canon 6 of the Proposed Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 31 (1969) (praising rules delineating lawyers‘ duties 
of loyalty).  
 69. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 46-47 (noting that ―the Model Code, 
however, was an important advance‖); Sutton, supra note 6, at 266 (―[T]he Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility represents (in my perhaps biased judgment) a giant step forward in 
the efforts of the legal profession to improve its ethical climate.‖). 
 70. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B), (D), (I) (1980); id. at DR 
2-103(B), (D); id. at DR 2-140(A). Note, the greatest changes in this area came in subse-
quent revisions in response to the Supreme Court‘s ruling that lawyer advertising received 
First Amendment protection as commercial speech in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 
U.S. 350 (1977).  
 71. See id. at DR 2-101(B), (D), (I); id. at DR 2-103(B), (D); id. at DR 2-140(A).   
 72. See id. at Pmbl. 
 73. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 19, at 617. The Model Code was superseded by 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which were adopted by the ABA in 
August 1983. See House of Delegates Proceedings, 108 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 763, 778 (1983).  
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monitor day-to-day legal practice.74 This moment was pivotal because 
it officially relegated issues of morality and lawyering to the ―aca-
demic‖ or ―personal‖ sphere and deemed such discussions irrelevant, 
inappropriate, or even illegitimate in the context of the practicing 
bar.75 While the rules did not bar discretionary consideration of mo-
rality, there was no requirement to weigh morality. The moral status 
quo became the elephant in the room, obscured by the immediate 
mandatory task of complying with disciplinary rules.76 Codification is 
often associated with transparency and its attendant virtues: open 
access, due process, and competition of ideas.77 Less emphasized, 
however, is the impact of codification on operationalizing and enforc-
ing norms that were previously unenforced.78 Enter the Model Code. 
A.   Rules Adopted; Ethics Orphaned 
 The Model Code‘s structure renders discussions of ethics and pro-
fessional conduct conceptually and practically distinct.79 The Code 
prioritized conduct rules over obligations to consider ethics. Conduct 
rules received the distinction of being enforceable and therefore im-
                                                                                                                  
 74. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 62, at 46 (―The codification of the law govern-
ing lawyers in the 1960s marked a major change in the structure and content of the ethical 
rules.‖); Hazard, supra note 7, at 1251 (―The transformation of the norms of professional 
conduct [into an enforceable legal code] was principally effected by the ABA‘s Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in 1970.‖). 
 75. This is not to say that discourse under the Canons actually centered more on sub-
stantive ethics. Certainly we have no evidence of a robust moral dialogue happening at the 
bar level under the Canons. In fact, there is scholarship indicating that civic-mindedness 
was actually in short supply. See generally Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Re-
publicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1397 (2003). The key difference with the Code, however, is that the Canons aspired to a 
notion of professional behavior that included and expected discussions of morality, regard-
less of whether those ideals were in fact realized.  
 76. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1249 (―[T]he legal profession‘s narrative and the core 
ethical rules, as pronounced in the 1908 Canons, has been preserved . . . . However, the 
form in which those rules are expressed has changed dramatically. What were fraternal 
norms issuing from an autonomous professional society have now been transformed into a 
body of judicially enforced regulations.‖). 
 77. Indeed, according to the Committee Chair Wright, the shift to the Code format in 
the Model Code was partially animated by a desire to create a fair system to incorporate 
new members into the established norms of the legal profession: ―The Rules are drafted in 
the form of statutes with specificity and clarity sufficient to meet due process requirements 
of disciplinary actions.‖ Wright, supra note 10, at 2. 
 78. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1250-51 (noting that integrating the bar as an aegis 
of the courts allowed for ―intensified disciplinary enforcement, including the sanctions of 
disbarment and suspension‖). 
 79. This distinction and the inclusion of ethical consideration with rules may have 
been inspired by the Joint Conference Report, which noted that ―[u]nder the conditions of 
modern practice it is particularly necessary that the lawyer should understand, not merely 
the established standards of professional conduct, but the reasons underlying these stand-
ards.‖ Fuller & Randall, supra note 26, at 1159. 
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portant.80 By structurally bifurcating ethical considerations from the 
disciplinary rules, the Model Code made clear that ethical issues (to 
the extent that they were discussed at all) were non-binding and ―as-
pirational.‖81 In adopting this format, the Model Code set the stage 
for minimizing discussions of morality among practicing lawyers and 
law students. Post-Model Code, the lawyerly inquiry is not ―What is 
the right thing or the professional thing to do?‖ but ―Do the Discipli-
nary Rules sanction doing or not doing A, B, or C?‖82 Morality is rele-
gated to an issue of private contemplation, rather than a topic for 
group analysis.83 As such, the Model Code denied new entrants to le-
gal practice the opportunity to discuss and change the moral norms 
governing lawyering as a whole. Instead, professional discourse fo-
cused on the floor provided by regulatory rules, rather than the moral 
ceiling.  
 In doing so, the bar was able to avoid a plurality of views concern-
ing a lawyer‘s core ethical duties (thus side-stepping the Wright 
Committee reporter‘s question, ―whose conscience and whose ethical 
standards are to control?‖84). Instead, it froze the conversation as it 
stood. Bifurcating moral issues from professional conduct allowed 
current members of the bar to avoid uncomfortable conversations 
with dissimilar colleagues. Meanwhile, discussions of the moral role 
of lawyers and related duties to society would become increasingly 
complicated as the bar diversified.  
                                                                                                                  
 80. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1980).  
 81. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics 
of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the 
Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV 411, 411 (2005) (arguing that the goals of the Model Code and 
Model Rules‘ ― ‗minimalist‘ project‖ and the ― ‗broadly  ethical‘ ‖ project conflict and there-
fore ―failed largely because the profession has divided what was once the single unifying 
goal for bar associations and lawyer regulators—providing moral, ethical, and practical 
guidance on how to practice law—into two quite distinct, and in some ways contradictory 
goals, thus undercutting the entire project‖); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good 
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 41-46 (1995) (argu-
ing that the regulatory focus of the codes has removed morality from ethics). 
 82. See Hazard, supra note 7, at 1241. 
 83. Some would argue that moral discussions still happen but in relation to the con-
tent of the rules, if not generally. I agree that (as with any law or code) moral arguments 
may be raised in questioning the legitimacy of rules governing lawyer conduct. However, 
these critiques center on the moral value of the specific rule at issue, and there is no re-
quirement that morality be discussed generally amongst the bar or with clients or that 
morality be reflected in the rules or conduct. Law often has a disconnect with moral judg-
ment. But we do not call law ethics. Moreover, discussions regarding the reform of rules 
will happen predominately in bar committees and subcommittees and in some cases among 
regulators (Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms), the elite, or academically inclined, not 
amongst lawyers generally.  
 84. Sutton, supra note 6, at 259-60 (official reporter for the Code writing on reasons 
supporting the Code‘s development).  
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 For example, a key point of contention facing the legal community 
in the 1960s was the moral legitimacy of civil disobedience. During 
the same years when the Wright Committee met and drafted the 
Code, both ABA President Powell and former Justice Whittaker (a 
member of the Wright Committee) spoke publically against civil dis-
obedience as a means of social change.85 Instead, they called for 
stronger government enforcement of criminal laws. One of their con-
cerns was that a rise in disrespect for the law and general lawless-
ness would undermine ―the good order and morality of our society.‖86 
Whittaker in particular was skeptical of demonstrations and ques-
tioned the motivations of civil rights protesters. He argued that ―cer-
tain self-appointed racial leaders, doubtless recalling the appease-
ments and, hence, successes of that earlier conduct, have simply 
adopted and used those techniques in fomenting and waging their 
lawless campaigns which they have called ‗demonstrations.‘ ‖87  
 Justice Whittaker stated that ―we must always strive to eliminate 
injustice and discrimination.‖88 However, he disagreed with non-
violent civil disobedience demonstrators about how to achieve that 
goal. He argued that ―we must do so by orderly processes in the legis-
latures and the courts, and not by defying their processes and ac-
tions, nor by taking the laws into our own hands.‖89 Tellingly, Justice 
Whittaker‘s writings on the subject lack awareness of institutional 
bias. He urged minorities to make use of the court system without 
acknowledging that the laws to which minorities are expected to 
show allegiance were often formed without their input and in viola-
tion of fundamental constitutional and moral principles.90 Likewise, 
there is no apparent cognizance of how judicial entities themselves are 
entrenched in their own norms, norms that may foreclose the possibil-
ity of meaningful redress through conventional legal processes. Rather, 
                                                                                                                  
 85. Concerned about civil disobedience‘s ability to ―seriously threaten the breakdown 
of law, order, and morality,‖ Charles Whittaker, in an address originally given to the Ten-
nessee Bar Association, called for ―impartial, evenhanded, vigorous, swift and certain en-
forcement of our criminal laws, and the real and substantial punishment thereunder of all 
conduct that violates those laws.‖ 111 CONG. REC. 15101-03 (1965) (introduced into the 
record by Sen. Strom Thurmond); id. at 15103 (arguing that ―[n]o ‗end‘ . . . however worthy 
[can ever] justify resort to unlawful means‖ and that ―America needs a genuine revival of 
respect for law and orderly process . . . a new impatience with those who violate and circum-
vent the laws, and a determined insistence that laws be enforced‖ (alterations in original)). 
 86. Id. at 15102. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 15101-03.  
 89. Id. at 15103. 
 90. See id. 
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Justice Whittaker argued that complying with the law and upholding 
legal institutions is the sole legitimate path to effectuate change.91  
 In the above example, the moral inquiry asks whether a lawyer 
owes a moral duty to follow the law even when the law is unjust. 
Members of the Committee viewed this as a potential clash, one 
where some lawyers would be more willing to assert that unjust laws 
are not entitled to automatic compliance. Such lawyers could argue 
that compliance with an unjust law is, in fact, immoral. Under the 
Model Code, practicing lawyers need not have this discussion or re-
solve this issue with their colleagues. The focus on the disciplinary 
rules made clear that lawyers need only discuss what is proper con-
duct in the service of clients, not whether or not clients ought to be 
prioritized over other societal obligations or whether lawyers should 
in fact consider the morality of the laws they are instrumental in  
implementing. 
 The avoidance of moral discussions in the professional context has 
continued to this day. The discussion of legal ethics in law schools is 
almost entirely rule-based.92 ―Legal Ethics‖ as a course name is often 
a misnomer for continuing legal education and law school courses 
that teach not frameworks for considering the moral implications or 
obligations of practice, but, rather, teach the predominantly code-
based law of lawyering.93 To the extent that lawyers consider the 
bounds of their duties to society, their clients, and the legal system, it 
is primarily, and perhaps only, in terms of complying with formal 
laws and regulations.94 From the ratification of the Model Code on-
                                                                                                                  
 91. See id. (―We must . . . seek redress in the courts rather than in the streets.‖).  
 92. This is partially due to the sweeping mandate of the ABA‘s accreditation provi-
sions for the mandatory ethics course in law school which requires treatment of ―the histo-
ry, goals, structures, values, and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.‖ 
A.B.A., THE 2012-2013 ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(5), at 15 (2012).  
 93. In required CLE and law school courses on ―legal ethics‖ there is little need, and 
certainly no requirement, to discuss morality. Of a survey of thirty-one textbooks on the 
subject of legal ethics and professional responsibility on the current market in 2013, fewer 
than half even use the term ―ethics‖ in their titles. See also Maksymilian Del Mar, Beyond 
Text in Legal Education: Art, Ethics, and the Carnegie Report, 56 LOY. L. REV. 955, 976-77 
(2010) (noting that professional responsibility and ethics courses in law school do not ad-
dress moral concerns but focus instead on the regulation of law practice); Deborah L. 
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 649 (1985) (―Legal 
ethics should be taught as ethics, not as etiquette or statutory exegesis. Law school courses 
and bar examinations that demand rote memorization of official standards merely trivial-
ize the subject matter.‖). 
 94. The Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, which is required for entrance 
to the bar in most states, tests most heavily on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
and ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Overview of the MPRE, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF 
BAR EXAM‘RS, http://www.ncbex.org/about-ncbe-exams/mpre/overview-of-the-exam/ (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
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wards, the term ―ethics‖ is not even in the titles of the ABA rules 
governing the legal profession.95  
 The division of ethics from rules in the Model Code presented mo-
rality as an issue outside of the lawyer‘s professional responsibility or 
training, a personal discretionary issue, without a clear place in pro-
fessional discourse or the workplace. While the Canons‘ moral validi-
ty was highly flawed,96 the ideal of lawyering perpetuated by the 
Canons required a consideration of moral issues. An attorney could 
not be a good lawyer and fail to consider (and act on) morality.97 In 
contrast, the neutral-partisan model in the Model Code and in the 
Model Rules today allows an individual to be a good lawyer and not 
weigh or act on morality at all. The model of lawyering that comes 
from the Model Code sets the expectation that lawyers will act as 
―amoral‖ agents.98 Yes, lawyers can exercise discretion to go above 
and beyond what is required of them as lawyers and consider morali-
ty (as many do). But the fact is that they are not required to. This 
shift relegated legal ethics qua ethics to the ivory tower of academia 
and personal, rather than professional, discourse.  
 Taking moral discussions off the table for lawyers also meant that 
lawyers unsympathetic to new viewpoints avoided the need to recon-
sider or modify their own practice. The proper role of lawyers in soci-
ety was beyond group revision. Moral condemnation of the basic role 
of lawyer as client conduit was out of place. Instead, the focus on day-
to-day conduct allowed the existing bar to shield the client-centric 
neutral-partisan model from serious attack while focusing discussion 
on disciplinary rules. This move conceded broad conceptual and moral 
issues to the status quo. The neutral-partisanship model allowed 
members of the bar to avoid awkward discussions regarding their per-
sonal views with dissimilar colleagues because it assumes that a law-
yer‘s personal morality remains separate from achieving client goals.99 
                                                                                                                  
 95. Compare ABA CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS (1908), with MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L 
RESPONSIBILITY (1980), and MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT (1983). 
 96. To be clear, this is not a call to reinstate the Canons. Others have called more 
generally for return to the Canons, whereas I am making a more limited claim. See Barton, 
supra note 81, at 434-36. 
 97. See infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.  
 98. As I discuss in detail infra Part III, there is no such thing as an amoral lawyer; 
the amoral lawyering ideal is imbued with rich moral judgments regarding agency, duty, 
societal norms, and expectations regarding human behavior.  
 99. It is worth noting that new members to the bar from outside of traditional profes-
sional circles are not spared discomfort under this model; rather, their discomfort may be 
increased in a system where topics available for discussion or redress forgo challenges to 
moral concerns in the context of professional practice. 
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B.   Enforceability: The Model Code and Discipline  
 As the demographic composition of the legal profession grew more 
inclusive, longstanding members of the bar could no longer rely on 
common experiences of education and upbringing, unspoken norms, 
or societal connections to predict (and control) the behaviors of other 
lawyers who moved in different social circles.100 The Model Code cre-
ated a national code of conduct with mandatory regulations specifi-
cally designed to increase enforceability over parties outside the am-
bit of the social circles of the existing bar.101 In doing so, the Code 
―transformed the dominant bar associations directly involved in bar 
discipline from private clubs into quasi-governmental organs.‖102 As 
such, the drafting of the Model Code did more than fend off encroach-
ment by the court on traditional self-regulation;103 it revealed the exist-
ing bar‘s increasing skepticism of the rapidly growing lawyer popula-
tion‘s ability to conform to norms without external consequences.  
 Newly anointed standards were given teeth. In the pre-Code era, 
―[t]he threat of professional discipline was virtually non-existent, as 
long as the lawyer did not commit a felony or a similarly egregious 
offense. The threat of legal malpractice recovery or of a remedy such 
as disqualification for a conflict of interest was almost as equally re-
mote.‖104 The disciplinary norms changed drastically post-Model 
Code. The Model Code provided a disciplinary workhorse to keep 
lawyers in line with dominant lawyering norms, rather than facilitat-
ing revision of these norms. Since 1969, lawyer regulation through 
the bar, courts, and malpractice litigation has risen significantly.105 
While some of this increase can be attributed to doctrinal shifts in 
                                                                                                                  
 100. The Model Code‘s disciplinary rules ―functioned as a statute defining legal con-
tours of a vocation whose practitioners were connected primarily by having been licensed to 
practice law.‖ Hazard, supra note 7, at 1241, 1244, 1251, 1260 (going on to note that ―[b]y 
the 1980‘s, the bar had become a ‗community‘ of strangers‖).  
 101. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 1 (―It was not until 1969, with the advent of the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, that American jurisdictions began to take the 
function of regulating lawyers seriously.‖). 
 102. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 217; see also Hazard, supra note 7, at 1241 (―[T]he legal 
profession‘s narrative and the core ethical rules, as pronounced in the 1908 Canons, has 
been preserved and largely unchanged . . . . However, the form in which those rules are 
expressed has changed dramatically. What were fraternal norms issuing from an autono-
mous professional society have now been transformed into a body of judicially enforced 
regulations.‖). 
 103. In the 1960s there was increased pressure from courts on the self-governance 
norm as they increasingly took an increased interest in shaping the profession‘s governing 
rules. Hazard, supra note 7, at 1242. 
 104. Wolfram, supra note 2, at 207. 
 105. ―While the absence of meaningful records precludes the generation of statistics of 
the extent of lawyer discipline prior to 1970, my distinct impression, in agreement with the 
bar‘s self-assessment, is that there was much less regulation compared to today.‖ Id. at 206. 
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third party standing,106 the growth of a plaintiffs‘ legal malpractice 
bar may also indicate a sense that the presence of a law-like code 
clarified the breach standards needed for conformity with the customs 
of the profession. More than forty years later, lawyers now comprise a 
highly regulated profession subject to direct statutory regulation and 
self-regulation as well as various common law regulations.107  
IV.   STANDARDIZING THE STANDARD CONCEPTION 
 The previous sections established a history of ideas—why neutral 
partisanship was adopted as a dominant model for lawyering in mo-
dernity (to facilitate pluralism) and what form that adoption took 
(the bifurcation of rules from ethics). The historic roots of the Model 
Code indicate a perceived need to avoid conflict and excise debates 
about morality from the legal profession in order to facilitate demo-
graphic plurality at the bar. This Part explores the conceptual and 
practical shortcomings of that choice by problematizing arguments 
that neutral partisanship is (1) anti-hierarchical and pro-client and 
(2) neutral to moral judgments.  
 The Model Code does not (and cannot) remove moral judgment 
from the code. Rather, by adopting and strengthening a commitment 
to neutral partisanship, the Model Code preserved the moral choices 
that predated the Code and limited the ability to change or alter 
those choices moving forward. Despite its appeal to universality, neu-
trality is not neutral. It favors one approach to lawyering over all 
others.108 Because it is viewpoint specific but does not facilitate dia-
logue on the content of that viewpoint, neutral partisanship deem-
phasizes and delegitimizes the individual moral contributions of new 
diverse lawyers by limiting value pluralism. 
 As such, the desire to avoid conflict in the bar did not eliminate 
moral conflict. Instead, the Model Code pushes conflict out of sight, 
where it is harder to investigate. Such suppressed struggles cause 
                                                                                                                  
 106. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961). 
 107. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 102 (1995) (―Increasingly, professional ideals have been turned into 
enforceable law, and self-regulation by the organized bar has become regulation by courts 
and legislatures.‖); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discard-
ing Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1229, 1275 (1995) (noting that the existence of disciplinary regulation and substantial 
regulatory law, including ―tort law, criminal law, agency law, and securities law,‖ belies 
the notion that lawyers are self-regulating); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 206; Zacharias, su-
pra note 7, at 1 (―The publication of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was a 
watershed event beginning a flood of ethics regulation that has yet to subside.‖). 
 108. For example, neutral partisanship leaves little room for lawyering rooted in empa-
thy, care, and emotions. See generally Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law 
and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010). 
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significant harm to lawyers as individuals as well as to relationships 
between lawyers and between lawyers and clients. Neutral partisan-
ship is also ill-suited to help a diverse bar that services diverse cli-
ents to negotiate real moral and practical dilemmas. This Part con-
cludes that the Model Code, as the basis of our modern legal ethics 
system, does not adequately respond to demographic and value plu-
ralism. As such, it cannot be justified on the terms of its adoption.  
A.   Neutral Partisanship: A Primer 
 Neutral partisanship is typically called the ―standard conception‖ 
of the lawyer‘s role, amoral lawyering or, in the pejorative, the law-
yer as a ―hired gun.‖109 Partisanship is the concept that the lawyer, 
within the boundaries of the law, ―is committed to the aggressive and 
single-minded pursuit of the client‘s objectives.‖110 Partisanship exists 
primarily in adversarial systems.111 Neutrality is a distinct concept; it 
requires that lawyers refrain from moral judgment over the lawful 
ends of the client or the lawful means used to attain those goals.112  
 Under the standard conception, lawyers are ―role-differentiated.‖ 
This means that lawyers must confine their individual moral views to 
their personal roles in life (outside of the workplace).113 Ideally, law-
                                                                                                                  
 109. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, A COMPEND OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 26 (1854); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional 
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980); Wolfram, supra note 2, at 210 (describing client-
centric lawyering as ―the bedrock of modern professional orthodoxy‖). 
 110. TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES?: A DEFENSE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION 
OF THE LAWYER‘S ROLE 5 (2009). 
 111. This Article does not interrogate the adversarial or partisan nature of the stand-
ard conception‘s ―neutral partisan‖ norm, but instead focuses on the neutrality aspect of 
this concept. Many scholars have critiqued the pitfalls of partisanship and particularly the 
use of the adversarial system. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
19-64 (2007) (revising Luban‘s 1983 essay and critiquing the premise that the adversarial 
system better pursues truth or the client‘s interest); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble 
with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
5 (1996). But see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS‘ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9, 12 
(1975) (championing the adversary system as protective of individuals‘ fundamental rights 
and emphasizing the importance of partisanship and neutrality); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984) (advocating for the adversary 
system). However, these concepts are analytically distinct: concepts of partisanship and 
neutrality need not be married with one another. This Article focuses on problems imbed-
ded with neutrality and role morality, not partisanship. 
 112. See Postema, supra note 109, at 73. For views critical of this approach, see Ste-
phen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the 
Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 247 (1985); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as 
Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Nov-
el, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697 (1988); William H. Simon, Ethical 
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).  
 113. See, e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 15-16 (1951) 
(―[Lawyers] are not dealing with the morals which govern a man acting for himself, but 
with the ethics of advocacy. We are talking about the special moral code which governs a 
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yers leave their professional role devoid of moral judgment and re-
main preoccupied only with questions of legality.114 As such, neutral 
partisanship provides moral non-accountability for lawyers: the cli-
ent, not the lawyer, is culpable for the moral worth of ends sought in 
a representation.115 Many refer to this concept as ―role morality‖ since 
morality, or at least moral accountability, is cabined to specific 
roles.116 Neutral partisanship in some form is a time-honored concept, 
one that some scholars trace back as far as the early 1800s.117  
 The Canons‘ version of neutral partisanship was qualified and fa-
vored lawyers employing their own morality in the context of client 
advocacy. While the Canons required lawyers to act as zealous advo-
cates for their clients, they also cautioned that a lawyer ―must obey 
his own conscience and not that of the client.‖118 The Canons remind-
ed lawyers that ―no client has a right to demand that his counsel 
shall be illiberal, or that he do anything therein repugnant to his own 
sense of honor and propriety.‖119 Moreover, under the Canons, a law-
yer had a duty to ―impress upon the client and his undertaking exact 
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law.‖120 The Canons 
concluded that a lawyer finds their ―highest honor in a deserved rep-
utation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest 
man and as a patriotic citizen,‖ not exclusively in the service of a  
client.121  
 The Model Code, in contrast, made a much stronger commitment 
to neutral partisanship.122 In it, the Wright Committee sought to 
eliminate what it perceived as a key ―dilemma‖ imbedded in the Can-
                                                                                                                  
man who is acting for another. Lawyers in their practice—how they behave elsewhere does 
not concern us—put off more and more of our common morals the farther they go in a pro-
fession which treats right and wrong, vice and virtue, on such equal terms.‖). 
 114. See David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEX. L. REV. 673, 673-74 (2012) (describ-
ing the position of W. Bradley Wendel in Lawyers and Fidelity to Law regarding the proper 
role of a lawyer). 
 115. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 614 (―[C]onduct by the lawyer in service to the client 
is judged by a different moral standard than the same conduct by a layperson. . . . [I]t is 
the client who is morally accountable, not the lawyer.‖). 
 116. Luban, supra note 114, at 674 (noting that the central question regarding role 
morality is, ―how can it be that her professional role might require a lawyer to do things 
that would be morally forbidden to a non-lawyer?‖).  
 117. DARE, supra note 110, at 6 (2009) (discussing Lord Brougham‘s famous speech in 
defense of Queen Caroline, pronouncing that in the discharge of his duty a lawyer ―knows 
but one person in all the world, and that person is his client‖). 
 118. Final Report, supra note 18, at 579. 
 119. Id. at 582. 
 120. Id. at 584. 
 121. Id. at 584. 
 122. See Papke, supra note 17, at 43 (―[F]ramers of the code reasserted the responsibility 
of individual lawyers to individual clients. Established ethical presumptions died hard.‖). 
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ons: ―whether to represent [a lawyer‘s] client in accordance with [the] 
law or in accordance with the lawyer‘s own moral viewpoint.‖123 While 
the official reporter of the Model Code, John Sutton, admitted that 
there was ―considerable professed support‖ for the view that a lawyer 
should ―obey his own conscience,‖124 he dismissed it as a ―standard-
less maelstrom‖ governed by ―whims, prejudices, emotional caprices, 
and predilections.‖125  
 The Model Code avoided this concern by making only very limited 
mention of moral responsibility on the part of lawyers. These men-
tions appear in the non-binding ―ethical considerations,‖ not the 
mandatory disciplinary rules, where the ethical considerations mere-
ly state that it is ―desirable‖ for a lawyer to point out morally just 
outcomes to clients.126 The clients themselves decide the course of ac-
tion. This side-steps a lawyer‘s moral accountability.127 For example, 
some scholars have argued that the Model Code forbids trial lawyers 
to even express an opinion as to the moral value of their client‘s 
case.128 Even in the area of deciding whether or not to take on certain 
clients, where lawyers under the Canons had previously enjoyed an 
unqualified right to refuse clients,129 the Model Code admonished 
such behavior. It declared that ―a lawyer should not lightly decline 
proffered employment.‖130 
 Additional commitments to client-centric neutral partisanship are 
clear in several sections of Model Code. One of the mandatory disci-
plinary rules states that ―[a] lawyer shall not intentionally fail to 
seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available 
means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules.‖131 Canon 7 of 
the Model Code, although not binding in the way the Disciplinary 
Rules are, reiterates this approach: ―A lawyer should represent a client 
zealously within the boundaries of the law.‖132 In the non-binding ―eth-
ical‖ authorities, lawyers are advised that ―[t]he professional judgment 
                                                                                                                  
 123. Sutton, supra note 6, at 260. 
 124. Final Report, supra note 18, at 579.  
 125. Sutton, supra note 6, at 259. 
 126. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980) (―A lawyer should bring to 
bear upon this decision-making process the fullness of his experience as well as his objective 
viewpoint. In assisting his client to reach a proper decision, it is often desirable for a lawyer to 
point out those factors which may lead to a decision that is morally just as well as legally per-
missible.‖). 
 127. See id. at EC 7-8, 7-9. 
 128. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 393 (1988). 
 129. Final Report, supra note 18, at 583-84 (which emphasizes a lawyer‘s ―right to de-
cline employment‖). 
 130. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26 (1980). 
 131. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1). 
 132. Id. at EC 7-1. 
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of a lawyer should be exercised . . . solely for the benefit of [the law-
yer‘s] client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.‖133  
B.   A Modern Moral Justification of Neutral Partisanship 
 Traditionally, champions of neutral partisanship defend it in 
pragmatic terms by arguing that neutral partisanship upholds the 
integrity of the adversarial system.134 Under these types of argu-
ments, a lawyer must take a neutral role as an advocate for her client 
in order to ascertain the truth and safeguard the public interest in 
the institutional integrity of the overall legal system.135 This view ar-
gues that allowing lawyers to exercise moral autonomy and judge the 
goals of the client‘s lawsuit undermines the functioning of the adver-
sarial judicial system as a whole, either by usurping the roles of the 
judge and jury or by undermining the system‘s ability to fact find.136 
In its briefest form, such proponents argue that an adversary system 
founded on neutral partisanship is the best way to ensure that truth 
is found and that cases are judged on their merits.137 A more cynical 
argument holds that neutral partisanship is simply a quid pro quo 
bargain for retaining a monopoly over professional legal services.138 
 All of these justifications and critiques of neutral partisanship are 
premised on the basic assumption that existing institutions of law, 
justice, and government are legitimate themselves and worth protect-
ing. However, in the late sixties and seventies, when the Model Code 
was written and ratified and subsequent iterations of national rule-
making were underway, skepticism of such institutions was wide-
                                                                                                                  
 133. Id. at EC 5-1. 
 134. See FREEDMAN, supra note 111, at 9, 12 (championing the client-centric adversary 
system as protecting the fundamental rights of individuals and emphasizing the im-
portance of partisanship and neutrality); LANDSMAN, supra note 111 (advocating for the 
adversary system). See generally Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (―[Our] 
system assumes that adversarial testing will ultimately advance the public interest in 
truth and fairness.‖); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (―[O]ur legal tradition 
regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the 
risk of error.‖). 
 135. See Papke, supra note 17, at 38 (―Sharswood argued that the lawyer was not re-
sponsible for the social utility of the cause he represented. If the lawyer began judging 
cases on his own, he would be usurping the powers of judge and jury who, more so than 
lawyers, carried a responsibility to the public at large.‖). 
 136. See Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. 
RTS. 1, 10-11 (1975) (contending that ―[i]f lawyers were to substitute their own private 
views of what ought to be legally permissible and impermissible for those of the legislature 
this would constitute a surreptitious and undesirable shift from a democracy to an oligar-
chy of lawyers‖). 
 137. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 26, at 1160-61. 
 138. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 616.  
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spread.139 Justifications predicated on protecting existing institutions 
and on the moral integrity of such instructions were questionable—
perhaps even untenable. Instead, another moral justification of neu-
tral partisanship was necessary—one resting on contemporary politi-
cal ideals such as equality, diversity, and individual access to power. 
It is on these bases that neutral partisanship needed to stake its 
claim in order to solidify its position as the default model of lawyer-
ing in modern America.  
 Responding to the political and social climate of post-sixties Amer-
ica, modern moral justifications for neutral partisanship emerged 
grounded in the language and causes of the civil rights movement: 
individual rights, diversity, and equality.140 This moral footing for 
neutral partisanship is best articulated in Stephen Pepper‘s seminal 
article The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and 
Some Possibilities.141  
 In the amoral lawyering account, neutral partisanship forwards 
the cause of the disenfranchised better than a morally active lawyer 
role because it allows the voice of the client to achieve its full legal 
ends unimpeded by the lawyer‘s own moral viewpoint.142 Since these 
values had inherent moral worth, so too did a role of lawyering con-
ceived to protect such interests.143 A lack of sophistication on the part 
of many clients justifies the lawyer‘s amoral role:  
                                                                                                                  
 139. See Andrew Kohut, Forward to PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE 
PRESS, DECONSTRUCTING DISTRUST: HOW AMERICANS VIEW GOVERNMENT (1998) (noting 
how in the sixties and seventies a ―healthy skepticism‖ toward government ―deteriorated 
into an outright distrust‖).  
 140. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 613 (stating that neutral partisanship is morally 
justified, ―primarily upon the values of individual autonomy, equality and diversity‖). For 
the purposes of this Article, I ask the reader to take as given that the ideals of individual 
autonomy, equality, and diversity are moral goals. While I realize that the moral worth of 
each of these is subject to debate, this Article considers, if we take Professor Pepper‘s cate-
gorization of these goals as valid, what does and should follow. See generally GERALD 
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 20 (1988) (―[A]utonomy is . . . a se-
cond-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, de-
sires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of 
higher-order preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their 
nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of 
person they are.‖). 
 141. Pepper, supra note 11, at 613. Professor Pepper‘s article is a cornerstone of the 
modern legal ethics canon. A recent search of LexisNexis revealed that, in addition to being 
cited in numerous legal ethics anthologies and textbooks, Pepper‘s article has been cited 
over three hundred times since 1986. 
 142. Pepper is concerned that lawyers will act as ―moral screens‖ obscuring client au-
tonomy. Id. at 621. 
 143. Staunch individualism has a long history in American political mythology. The Mod-
el Code‘s own opening sentence states that ―[t]he continued existence of a free and democratic 
society depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based upon the rule of law 
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[U]nfiltered access to the law is then available only to those who 
are legally sophisticated and to those able to educate themselves 
sufficiently for access to the law, while those less sophisticated—
usually those less educated—are left with no access or with access 
that subjects their use of the law to the moral judgments and veto 
of the lawyer.144  
 Under this view neutral partisanship is necessary in a pluralistic 
society to safeguard the masses from the oppressive oligarchy of the 
lawyer class.145 Justifying neutral partisanship in these terms pre-
sented reform-minded lawyers with an argument in favor of strict role 
differentiation rooted in their own values. The idea that different 
views and parties would coexist best by seeking a neutral baseline for 
lawyer conduct has a certain intuitive appeal.  
 Proponents of neutral partisanship, in service of pluralism, equali-
ty, and diversity argued that in a pluralistic society moral lawyers 
not only may, they must differentiate their personal selves from their 
professional ones in order to allow various client views to filter into 
the system: ―The lawyer is a good person in that he provides access to 
the law; in providing such access without moral screening he serves 
the moral values of individual autonomy and equality.‖146 Since ―lib-
erty and autonomy are a moral good,‖ so too is neutral partisanship, 
which is ―better than constraint.‖147 Under this theory, if given a 
choice, diversity and autonomy are so morally valuable that they 
trump general pursuits of ―right‖ or ―good‖ conduct.148 Thus, ―[f]or ac-
cess to law to be filtered unequally through the disparate moral views 
of each individual‘s lawyer does not appear to be justifiable.‖149 
 However intuitive, this assertion fails upon closer scrutiny. Client-
centric neutral partisanship cannot be adequately justified in terms 
of defending client autonomy, equality, or diversity since it ultimate-
ly undermines each of these concepts in important and irreconcilable 
                                                                                                                  
grounded in respect for the dignity of the individual and his capacity through reason for en-
lightened self-government.‖ MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Pmbl. (1980). 
 144. Pepper, supra note 11, at 619. 
 145. See id. at 617 (arguing that neutral partisanship facilitates a diversity of clients to 
play out their individual autonomy in an unimpeded fashion without ―substitut[ing] law-
yers‘ beliefs‖).  
 146. Pepper, supra note 11, at 634. 
 147. Id. at 616.  
 148. In Professor Pepper‘s view, equality of access to law is also a ―significant value‖ 
worthy of such extreme protection and one that the neutral-partisan model champions. Id. 
at 616. 
 149. Id. at 618. 
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ways.150 The following sections examine these shortcomings both con-
ceptually and pragmatically.  
C.   Neutral Partisanship as a Vehicle for Client Autonomy 
 The idea that exercises of individual autonomy in accordance with 
law are an unequivocal moral good is a subject of debate. One danger 
of this assertion is that it ―would conflate the morality of the action 
with the morality of autonomously having chosen it.‖151 Professor Da-
vid Luban notes this is particularly problematic because ―some things 
[that are] legally right are not morally right.‖152 In contrast, amoral 
lawyering ―assumes that the morality is already in the law, that in 
any important sense anything legally right is morally right.‖153 In or-
der for this to be true, neutral partisanship under the amoral lawyer-
ing view would carry an extreme libertarian view that any infringe-
ment on individual freedom is so morally repugnant as to outweigh 
the moral downfalls of the content of that act.  
 Additional arguments regarding the modern amoral lawyering 
rationale are grounded in practice; even if an individual makes a 
choice for a given outcome, if the ability to reach that outcome is fun-
damentally compromised by her relationship with her lawyer, then the 
client‘s exercise of autonomy does not exist in any meaningful way.154 
This section contends that regardless of perfect access to amoral law-
                                                                                                                  
 150. See, e.g., W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 4, 11 (2010) (argu-
ing that a modified version of neutral partisanship that places fidelity to legal entitlements 
rather than client interests is essential in a value pluralistic society since law represents ―a 
provisional settlement of these controversies, to enable cooperative action in response to 
some collective need‖ and that ―[t]here is moral value in doing one‘s part to support a so-
cially valuable institution‖). I reserve discussion of the issue of whether this modified ver-
sion of neutral partisanship would succeed in terms of defending pluralism and focus here 
on assessing the more conventional version of neutral partisanship at play in the Model 
Code and incorporated into subsequent rulemaking.  
 151. Id. at 33. 
 152. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 11 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 638 (1986) (―[S]ome things legally right are not morally right.‖ 
(quoting Abraham Lincoln)). 
 153. Id. 
 154. For the purposes of this Article, I will assume, as most legal ethics codes do, that 
good lawyering includes loyalty to one‘s client as well as communication and candor be-
tween the lawyer and her client. As of July 2014, all jurisdictions in the United States in-
clude provisions that outline a duty of loyalty, communication, and candor towards clients 
in some form. It is a matter of live dispute, however, whether such duties, or any duties, 
should run to clients versus the law, human dignity, or an overall sense of substantive 
justice. The amoral lawyering stance discusses individual autonomy in terms of clients, 
and therefore this Article will approach the standard conception from the point of view that 
is now, in the post-Code era, most widely accepted—a client-centric model.  
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yers, the neutral-partisan ideal would continue to be suspect under jus-
tifications grounded in diversity, equality, and individual autonomy.155 
 1.   Candor, Loyalty, and Effective Client Service 
 Many would include zeal as an essential element of good lawyer-
ing.156 Here lies an inherent weakness in neutral partisanship: it un-
dermines loyalty and the trust of clients in their lawyers. This inhib-
its the ability of lawyers and clients to have a relationship with a 
meaningful implementation of loyalty, communication, and candor.157 
By being willing, for pay, to set aside one‘s personal principles and 
views, lawyers undermine their moral standing and forfeit credibility 
with laypeople.158 Then, those same laypeople are put in the uncom-
fortable position of having to trust a party they know to be, by all 
typical standards, untrustworthy. Without the candor that comes 
with trust, a lawyer cannot build an effective case and relationship 
with a client. Thus, the amoral lawyering model frequently handi-
caps a lawyer from effective practice and even client service. 
 The idea that clients can exercise unimpeded autonomy through a 
neutral-partisan model of lawyering is undercut by the relationship 
between trust, empathy, and candor.159 People come to lawyers in 
times of great vulnerability, often when something of critical im-
portance in their lives is awry.160 Clients want to trust their law-
yers.161 Yet a lawyer who complies with her duties as delineated by 
                                                                                                                  
 155. I concede that in a non-adversarial system, neutrality might be more defensible. 
This Article argues within, and to some extent assumes as given, our current system—an 
adversarial one grounded in client-centric work. For the reasons hinted at below, I have 
serious concerns about the moral worth of non-adversarial judicial systems in deliberative 
democracies, though I would agree with other scholars that client focus should potentially 
yield to other loyalties and is likely better conceptualized as a duty ―to protect the legal 
entitlements of clients, not advance their interests.‖ WENDEL, supra note 150, at 6.  
 156. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165 (2006). 
But see LUBAN, supra note 111, at 19-64 (revising Luban‘s 1983 essay). 
 157. See, e.g., Irma S. Russell, Keeping the Wheels on the Wagon: Observations on Is-
sues of Legal Ethics for Lawyers Representing Business Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 513, 
522 (2003) (―[T]he lawyer who bites his tongue rather than voice the unpleasant argument 
against a client‘s course of action fails more than his own conscience; he fails to fulfill the 
foundational duty of providing candid legal advice.‖). 
 158. Perhaps this is why the media valorizes lawyers who break with professional ethics 
and instead comport with expectations of common morality. See Robert C. Post, On the Popu-
lar Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 379, 386 (1987). 
 159. The Oxford English Dictionary defines empathy as ―[t]he . . . power of projecting 
one‘s personality into [and so fully comprehending the] . . . object of contemplation.‖ 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). Since lawyers, under a neutral-partisan ideal, 
seek to treat their personal selves as irrelevant, empathy is out of place.  
 160. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 615. 
 161. See generally COREY S. SHDAIMAH, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE 
LAWYERING, LOW-INCOME CLIENTS, AND THE QUEST FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (2009) (citing 
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the Model Code can greet them with a complete lack of sympathy or 
empathy—in fact, they are expected to do just that. Lawyers, by sep-
arating their personal selves strictly from their professional selves, 
appear ―heartless,‖ only in the representation to receive fees and 
therefore only looking out for their own personal material interest.162 
A lack of aligned interests may also impact the ability of a lawyer to 
engage in competent representation. If a lawyer believes in the case 
of her client, then she is genuinely motivated to be timely, diligent, 
and creative and to work hard to reach the client‘s goals. Alignment 
of interests may also support competency, as ―[t]here are severe limi-
tations on the extent to which a person, particularly a stranger, can 
understand with any depth the ends of another without actually 
sharing those ends.‖163 But instead of expecting lawyers only to take 
on cases that comport with their ordinary moral views, lawyers are 
expected to represent all clients zealously without believing in the 
outcomes of their cases. 
 2.   Codifying Trust: The Model Code’s Bind  
 Neutral partisanship creates the situation where the Model Code 
must artificially attempt to emulate qualities of actual loyalty-based 
relationships through piecemeal rubrics. The Model Code states that 
lawyers must be loyal, diligent, and competent with client‘s work and 
represent the client with zeal.164 The Model Code attempts to deal 
with the disconnect between role differentiation and traditional loy-
alty by crafting a set of contorted rules that have only become more 
painfully strained and convoluted over time. Much of the Code at-
tempts to regulate and create mechanically what can only grow out of 
a genuine alignment of interests: trust and loyalty.165  
                                                                                                                  
interviews of clients expressing that friendship and trust were at the forefront of what they 
wanted from lawyers). 
 162. ―Greed‖ is a common term that arises in public descriptions of lawyers. See Paul F. 
Teich, Are Lawyers Truly Greedy? An Analysis of Relevant Empirical Evidence, 19 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 837, 847 (2013); see also Marianne M. Jennings, Moral Disengagement 
and Lawyers: Codes, Ethics, Conscience, and Some Great Movies, 37 DUQ. L. REV. 573, 575-
76 (―[M]oral disengagement still creates an ethical pressure cooker from which there is no 
release.‖). 
 163. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 59 n.70; see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The 
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (emphasizing 
how a personal relationship between a client and her attorney can enable the exercise of 
autonomy within the legal system). 
 164. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980) (client confidences); 
id. at DR 6-101 (competence and diligence); id. at DR 7-101 (zeal). 
 165. See generally id. at Canon 6 (laying out detailed instructions regarding conflicts of 
interest).  
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 However, trust between people is ordinarily predicated on honesty 
and mutuality. It requires candid disclosure of beliefs and the mutual 
vulnerability attendant to that disclosure. No amount of mechanical 
rulemaking can counter the lack of mutual openness in building 
trust. Therefore, if the legal profession truly believes that client can-
dor is essential to representation in an adversarial system, then a 
failure to discuss, disclose, and act in keeping with a lawyer‘s auton-
omy undermines a key aspect of representation. Clients will trust 
lawyers who are telling them the truth about themselves and being 
forthcoming with their views. In contrast, the neutral-partisanship 
model asks clients to do what lawyers themselves are unwilling to 
do—be open.  
 Ultimately, rules can only give assurance to clients who have faith 
in rules, rule of law, and the fair execution of law. Proxy loyalty is 
little more than a house of cards built upon certain assumptions re-
garding human experience: that clients will enter a relationship with 
a lawyer believing that law and rules are reliable, fair, and justly en-
forced. For many clients, particularly less enfranchised individuals or 
non-institutional clients, the inverse view of the reliability of rules 
and law is just as likely as such faith.  
 Ultimately, client autonomy is best served by lawyers who genu-
inely believe in clients and their causes. Neutral partisanship divorc-
es lawyers from this rich sense of loyalty that flows organically from 
aligned interests. Instead, clients must trust in rule of law, the code 
of lawyers, and the court to enforce formalistic loyalty. This is not a 
neutral assumption, it is one made from a point of view colored by 
experiences with the law as a benign facilitator rather than an ob-
struction or tool of persecution. Lawyers are expected to act with 
conviction, but not have actual conviction. This leaves only one active 
word—lawyers must ―act.‖ Thus, lawyers are expected not only to be 
advocates, but actors that give convincing imitations of loyalty and 
candor without conviction. This undermines the profession‘s stature 
and credibility in the public eye. By adopting a strong version of neu-
tral partisanship, the Model Code created a perverse system where 
only clients who are themselves ―amoral‖ (either through role dif-
ferentiation or an antisocial tendency to aver moral norms) gain the 
full benefit of an open relationship with their lawyers and full effec-
tive representation. 
 3.   Clients and the Knowledge Deficit  
 Even if the Model Code managed to emulate loyalty effectively, 
neutral partisanship obscures a lawyer‘s actual agenda and views, 
again disadvantaging clients. By allowing lawyers to claim moral dis-
tinction from their client‘s ends, lawyers inhabit a professional iden-
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tity steeped in ambiguity. The client ought to be able to choose coun-
sel knowing what her lawyer actually thinks of the moral content of 
the suit at hand.166 In a value-pluralistic society, it is likely that a 
client would find relevant what his lawyer really thinks of the moral 
validity of his case. However, the current system forces clients to 
make choices regarding their representation without knowledge of a 
lawyer‘s moral view on the substantive issues. The client is required 
to trust that a lawyer‘s personal views will not undermine the repre-
sentation. This impedes, rather than empowers, client autonomy.  
 The client deserves, and arguably needs, to know what her lawyer 
believes. It is often vital for clients to know whether or not the lawyer 
is truly invested in the client‘s legal goal or only performs a series of 
mechanically required acts as if she cared about the client.167 With 
such information at hand, the client, not the lawyer, can decide 
whether or not she is comfortable with a lawyer who does or does not 
share her moral views. This decision ought to lie with the client, at 
least under a view privileging client autonomy. Right now, only the 
lawyer knows of this potential disconnect, and the standard concep-
tion of lawyering paternalistically decides that this information is not 
relevant to the client (conveniently allowing an attorney to take on 
clients with conflicting moral positions for her own financial gain). 
Rather than allowing a lawyer to determine her impartiality (the fox 
guarding the henhouse), the rules could require that a lawyer reveal 
to the client any moral viewpoints on the representation she may 
have, allowing the client to consider these issues and waive any con-
flicts should the client feel that the lawyer, nonetheless, would be an 
excellent advocate. 
 Under a neutral-partisan system, the service that some clients 
receive will also be systematically better than that of others. The par-
ties best served by the profession‘s allegiance to the concept of role 
morality are those clients who are also disciples of the ―neutral parti-
san‖ ethos. Clients who share the morally-charged view that parties 
or entities may separate professional activities from moral accounta-
bility are given the privilege (and advantage) of having a lawyer with 
genuinely aligned interests. But shouldn‘t ordinary individual cli-
                                                                                                                  
 166. It is never possible to have complete knowledge in a given representation, even on 
the part of a lawyer. See, e.g., Spaulding, supra note 11, at 1384 (―[L]awyers know that 
their advice and advocacy will almost never be based on anything approaching complete 
knowledge.‖). However, calculated and sanctioned failure to disclose information is a dif-
ferent matter.  
 167. Anne E. Thar, What Do Clients Really Want? It’s Time You Found Out, 87 ILL. B.J. 
331 (1999) (reporting that more than skill or knowledge, what clients wanted from a law-
yer was to know that the lawyer cared).  
182  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:151 
 
 
ents, unlikely to live in a role-differentiated manner, also have access 
to the same aligned, zealous representation?  
 Finally, a principal concern in the amoral lawyering justification 
of neutral partisanship is that lawyers will infringe on a client‘s au-
tonomy because of their disproportionate share of power in the rela-
tionship.168 On the basis of this perceived power-differential, neutral 
partisanship limits the power of lawyers and expands relative client 
power.169 While this may have been a genuine concern in the 1960s 
when the bar itself was filled with wealthy, privileged, predominately 
white, and generally elite individuals, as the project of diversifying 
and expanding the bar changed the composition of the bar, this reali-
ty may have also changed. The amoral lawyer defense of the neutral-
partisan model assumes that (1) clients are less sophisticated than 
lawyers and (2) that the lawyers are financially independent and 
therefore are not subject to the client‘s power of the purse.  
 Today, neither of these points is clear, particularly in the private 
sector. Many clients, particularly corporate entities, have more power 
in both society and in the client-lawyer relationship than their law-
yers. Many, if not most, lawyers are not independently wealthy and 
many are saddled with debt.170 They are not, by and large, practicing 
the law solely as a vocation. It is a job and they must make money to 
live. Therefore, because clients control the money and can withdraw 
their business and go elsewhere, clients, not lawyers, often have the 
coercive power in the attorney-client relationship.  
D.   Defining Neutrality and the Limits of Self:  
Diversity and Equality 
 The final modern justifications for neutral partisanship are that it 
protects diversity and equality.171 However, this attempt is premised 
on accepting that: (1) neutrality protects those with minority view-
points from the majority imposing its moral notions and (2) ―neutral‖ 
rules lack a viewpoint and are impartial. This section questions these 
assumptions and looks specifically at how they interact with concepts 
of diversity and equality.  
                                                                                                                  
 168. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 634 (―Because of the large advantages over the client 
built into the lawyer‘s professional role, and because of the disadvantages and vulnerability 
built into the client‘s role, the professional must subordinate his interest to the client‘s.‖).  
 169. See id. 
 170. See Sam Favate, Law Students, How Much Debt Do You Want?, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL LAW BLOG, Mar. 23, 2012, 12:30 PM, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/03/23/law-
students-how-much-debt-do-you-want/ (noting that in the top ten most expensive law 
schools, ―the average student debt was $147,717 in 2011,‖ and overall for all law schools 
the average student debt in 2011 was over $100,000). 
 171. See Pepper, supra note 140.  
2014]  THE COST OF AVOIDANCE 183 
 
 1.   No One Is Neutral: An Example 
 The existence of human neutrality in any form is questionable; no 
person exists without a viewpoint.172 Rather, what would neutral 
qualities of lawyering look like without a background or viewpoint to 
fill that term with meaning? How can one define diligence or compe-
tence without a full human identity, without a background upon 
which to define such terms? Devoid of a set of experiences that shape 
her consciousness, a person would be less than human.173  
 Take Professor Pepper‘s article on neutrality as a case study of 
imbedded viewpoint specificity; here, Pepper‘s experiences regarding 
social structures weaken his ideological arguments regarding the 
moral worth of individual autonomy and diversity. After raising ar-
guments in favor of the moral worth of amoral lawyering on the basis 
of protecting unfettered client autonomy, Professor Pepper explains 
the concern that ―many clients will come through the door without 
much internal moral guidance.‖174 According to Professor Pepper, cli-
ents‘ lack of moral guidance is the product of a ―secularized society‖ 
that lacks ―homogenous moral communities.‖175 First, this assumes 
that because a lawyer fails to discern an internal guidance, it is in 
fact not there. Second, equating morality with immersion in a ho-
mogenous moral community is in tension with a commitment to valu-
ing diversity. This statement seems to indicate that pluralism func-
tions as an intermediary step towards a homogenous ideal: a benevo-
lent assimilation process into a brave new homogenous (moral) world. 
And yet, it is the moral worth of pluralism that buttresses Professor 
Pepper‘s argument for much of his article. Many ―Americans take 
their pluralism as a fact to celebrate rather than a problem to be 
overcome‖; however, here the lack of a singular moral vision in a 
community is viewed as a lack of moral substance.176  
 The article goes on to reveal other imbedded assumptions regard-
ing society and its norms and values. In discussing client morality, it 
paints a nostalgic picture of the past when clients gained their moral 
                                                                                                                  
 172. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 11 (1989) 
(―[G]ender-neutral terms frequently obscure the fact that so much of the real experience of 
‗persons,‘ so long as they live in gender-structured societies, does in fact depends on what 
sex they are.‖); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (deny-
ing the presence of an ―unencumbered‖ self). 
 173. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 
1984) (arguing that the self is constituted by a life story with a purpose or ―telos‖). 
 174. Pepper, supra note 11, at 627. It is not without a certain irony that one can imag-
ine that certain clients would feel similarly about the ―neutral‖ lawyers that come through 
the door seemingly devoid of morality. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Spaulding, supra note 11, at 1389 (discussing how in a value-pluralistic society 
referencing ―ordinary morality‖ offered little substantive mooring).  
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footing from ―[t]he rural town, the ethnic neighborhood, the church 
attended for several generations, the local business or trade communi-
ty.‖177 This is a world far removed from the ―urbanized society‖ of the 
Model Code.178 Here the viewpoint provides a key insight: Professor 
Pepper‘s description is ideal to some, while morally oppressive to oth-
ers. Some may think of rural towns as quiet places where children play 
safely in the streets, but to others these same neighborhoods and 
groups were strongholds of provincialism, places where racially re-
strictive covenants, restrictive zoning, or community norms prevented 
many people from living productive lives. Many small trade groups 
(including the nascent ABA) historically excluded minorities and wom-
en. However, Professor Pepper‘s experiences with these institutions 
may have led him to be less skeptical of these institutions as sources of 
morality, despite the fact that other rational thoughtful people may 
view them as the opposite based on their factual experiences.  
 Finally, when Professor Pepper asks, ―would there have been more 
social justice, equality, or general welfare if lawyers had altered or 
withheld services on the basis of their own (largely middle- or upper-
class) values?‖ he reveals not only that he assumes that lawyers are 
of a certain economic class but that the class to which they belong 
has some sort of unitary overarching set of beliefs.179 The answer to 
his question as phrased may be ―no,‖ but this claim is falsifiable. 
There is also no reason why the socio-economic class of lawyers need 
be grounded in a particular narrow set of class values—unless the 
bar is failing to include people from varied backgrounds. The problem 
is not that lawyers will screen client values. The problem is that law-
yers are a monolithic privileged group legislating over clients with 
whom they share little or no experience or values. How would we an-
swer the following question: Would there have been more social jus-
tice, equality, or general welfare if lawyers from all walks of life rep-
resented clients whose legal ends they believed in?  
 The point here is not to denigrate Professor Pepper‘s important 
scholarship and considerable influence. Rather, it is to point out that 
even a careful, well-intentioned, intelligent person who is trying to 
protect diversity, equality, and individual autonomy is unable to set 
aside the lens through which they interpret the world.  
                                                                                                                  
 177. Pepper, supra note 11, at 627. 
 178. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). 
 179. Pepper, supra note 11, at 620. 
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 2.   Racism Without Racists180 
 Codifying neutral partisanship in the 1960s is not only problemat-
ic because the possibility of human neutrality is generally suspect. It 
is also an issue because neutrality had a particular socially charged 
understanding at that time. Neutrality, like color-blindness, was an 
attempt to conceptualize means for achieving social equality in a 
country of racially and ethnically diverse citizens. This nascent theo-
retical understanding of how to facilitate equal access to justice and 
free exercise of rights and how to strive towards equality shaped the 
Model Code (and by extension, the subsequent rules of conduct that 
have followed). While the concepts of the Model Code have remained 
relatively static in Model Rules of Professional Conduct today, under-
standings of inequality in a pluralistic society have developed fur-
ther. This section seeks to bridge that divide.  
 Most likely, the drafters of the Model Code were familiar with ar-
guments in favor of remedying social inequality through ―colorblind-
ness.‖ The concept of colorblindness was prevalent in discussions con-
temporary to the drafting of the Model Code as related to civil rights 
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s.181 The president of the ABA who 
called the Wright Committee, Justice Powell, went onto join the Su-
preme Court where he authored several important opinions regard-
ing race and colorblindness.182 No doubt there is an appeal to the idea 
that the best way to make sure different people are treated fairly is 
to treat them all the same. The problem lies in determining how you 
will treat them all the same—and who defines that sameness.  
 The dangers of institutional mandates for neutrality are very sim-
ilar to those imbedded in colorblindness in that both support, wheth-
er consciously or subconsciously, a hierarchy where the dominant 
groups‘ status is the ―norm‖ and all other groups are the non-neutral 
                                                                                                                  
 180. I have borrowed this phrase from Eduardo Bonilla-Silva‘s book of the same name. 
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS (2010) (arguing that colorblindness 
creates its own form of racism). But see generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, WHITE 
SUPREMACY (1981) (arguing that racism should only apply to practices that hinge on white 
supremacy, the idea that whites as a race are inherently better and more capable than 
other races). 
 181. See JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, 
CULTURE, AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 28-34 (1996) (detailing the development of colorblind-
ness arguments dating back to 1884 and up through the key discrimination legislation in 
the 1960s); see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301–14 (2012); Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
 182. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987) (finding no discrimination in 
Georgia‘s death penalty system despite the fact that Georgia imposed death sentences on 
blacks who murder whites at twenty-two times the rate of blacks who murder blacks); Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (finding that racial and ethnic clas-
sifications of any sort are inherently suspect and call for strict scrutiny, even when reme-
dial in nature).  
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―other.‖183 Norms and assumptions impact how rules are written and 
how institutions function.184 This skews the system towards the 
preexisting status quo, regardless of intent, and creates a fissure be-
tween ―our public commitments and our lived realities.‖185 Under this 
understanding, outsider groups are allowed entrance into traditional-
ly exclusive groups, such as the bar, only if they conform their con-
duct to the dominant groups‘ norms. Successful assimilators gain ac-
cess to the dominant group‘s power. The price is that in exchange, 
these people‘s distinct views, skills, and cultural influences are cast 
aside.186 Neutrality accommodates difference only by ignoring and 
therefore sublimating it. It does so by creating a neutral baseline 
comfortable to the dominant class of lawyers and based on their as-
sumptions of what is neutral lawyer behavior. But assumptions are 
defined by this class‘s experience and therefore are, necessarily, non-
neutral.  
 Ian Haney-López lays out the limitations of colorblindness, noting 
that while it may have undercut ideas of white supremacy during the 
first phase of the civil rights movement, colorblindness was ineffec-
tive at dealing with systemic lingering racism.187 So too here, one can 
imagine that perhaps at the outset of the Model Code, there may 
have been utility to shielding lawyers for the moral pronouncement 
of the majority. But whatever efficacy that policy may have had in 
relation to overt recognition, it has run its course.188  
                                                                                                                  
 183. In this way, neutral partisanship falls prey to similar pitfalls to John Rawls‘s 
original position. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971) (asserting as his 
original position that the best way to create a just society was to organize it from behind a 
―veil of ignorance‖ as if one did not have any specific identity or moral standpoint and also 
had no idea where one would be placed within the social order). Presumably this situation 
would allow the party involved to be impartial and fair. However, critiques of Rawls have 
clarified how in the attempt to create an impartial self, Rawls has actually created an indi-
vidual who cannot exist as a real person, because a real person is part of incorporated enti-
ties, like the family, that have their own imbedded structure. See OKIN, supra note 172,  
at 96-99.  
 184. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
157 (2006) (―Colorblindness is in this sense not a prescription but an ideology, a set of un-
derstandings that delimits how people comprehend, rationalize and act in the world.‖). 
 185. Id. at 144. 
 186. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” 
Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 103-05 (2000).  
 187. See LÓPEZ, supra note 184, at 157-58 (―In the wake of the civil rights movement‘s 
limited but significant triumphs, the relationship between colorblindness and racial reform 
changed remarkably. Whereas colorblindness in the context of Jim Crow was heavy with 
emancipatory promise, in the civil rights era and since, its greatest potency instead lies in 
preserving the racial status quo.‖). 
 188. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 6 (1991) (―[B]efore a private person or a government agent can decide ‗not to consider 
race,‘ he must first recognize it. In other words, we could say that one ‗noticed race but did 
not consider it.‘ ‖).  
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 The issue we face now is one of structural inequality.189 Color-
blindness still requires that whoever enters the dominant group as-
similate or ―pass‖ as white:  
We must be careful not to discount the willingness of significant 
sectors within the White community to extend a presumption of 
full human worth to racial minorities—nor should we be surprised 
that this presumption of full humanity often translates into treat-
ing ostensibly non-White persons as if they were White.190 
 Likewise, in the legal profession, compliance with neutral parti-
sanship awards women and minorities full lawyer status for conform-
ing their behavior to the preexisting norms established in lawyering 
prior to their entrance into the profession. As such, being treated 
―like a lawyer‖ translates into non-male, non-white, non-traditional 
lawyers being treated as the preexisting demographic of the bar 
(white men), or, alternatively, the way well-meaning white men 
might paternalistically treat women and minorities.  
 3.   The Model Code Decoded: Examples of Non-Neutral “Neutrality”  
 Doctrinally, neutral partisanship is supported by attempting to 
set a baseline of conduct that is unpoliticized. However, the very con-
ceptions of what is a lawyer‘s proper role, what are a lawyer‘s man-
datory duties, and how daily practice unfolds have rippling repercus-
sions for the bar generally, certain lawyers in particular, disenfran-
chised clients, and the legal system. These choices are not neutral, 
nor can they be. The choices made in the Model Code, and now the 
Model Rules, reflect a certain view of agency and the lawyer‘s priori-
tization of duties to client, law, society, and broader morality. It is a 
moral view, and it cannot be neutral. In it, agency is defined in terms 
of a certain type of loyalty, a certain type of candor (regarding the law 
but not the lawyer‘s self), a certain type of competency, and confidenti-
ality. In it, duties to clients are paramount. The examples provided 
below are meant to be illustrative of this point, but not exhaustive.  
 The 1969 Model Code set priorities for the legal profession by 
enumerating skills or duties necessary for lawyering in the discipli-
nary rules. These enumerated duties included competence, diligence, 
loyalty, and candor.191 In keeping with established conventions of 
                                                                                                                  
 189. See generally Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779 
(2012) (discussing how intent and colorblindness combine to fail to remedy lasting struc-
tural inequality).  
 190. LÓPEZ, supra note 184, at 154.  
 191. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1980). 
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code interpretation, anything not on the list is excluded.192 Thus, the 
Model Code‘s explicit articulation of relevant skills also creates a list 
of irrelevant skills. Lawyers who have strengths that are not neutral 
under status quo-defined baseline are at a disadvantage.193  
 For example, in attempting to reach a neutral baseline, the Model 
Code adopted a version of lawyering that minimized and marginal-
ized skills associated with women, particularly skills emphasizing 
emotional intelligence or group consciousness.194 Why? The Model 
Code was the first time the bar attempted to write rules that defined 
a baseline of conduct in a ―neutral‖ way for a pluralistic group. The 
Canons, in contrast, did not need to be ―neutral‖ across differences—
the bar was generally homogenous. In the attempt to create a neutral 
code, the drafters of the Model Code most likely excised qualities that 
they felt were not neutral. However, since they defined a baseline 
from their viewpoints, a neutral code was one without ―gendered‖ 
qualities—meaning those qualities associated with women.  
 Some of the qualities that could be included on this list are com-
passion, empathy/sympathy, and relationship building.195 Compas-
sion is not only excluded as a necessary lawyerly trait: one could ar-
gue it is expressly barred. For example, DR-103(B) forbids the ad-
                                                                                                                  
 192. In statutory interpretation terms this is known as ―expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius,‖ meaning ―the express mention of one thing excludes all others.‖ BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 193. The exclusion of these traits has actually led to a norm that is generally harmful 
to the profession, as the public has grown to perceive lawyers as heartless and self-
interested, and lawyers themselves have fallen into higher rates of depression and dissatis-
faction. See Jacquelyn Smith, The Happiest and Unhappiest Jobs in America, FORBES 
(Mar. 22, 2013, 2:55 PM), www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/03/22/the-happiest-
and-unhappiest-jobs-in-america/ (listing associate attorney as the most unhappy profession 
in America).  
 194. For the sake of demonstration, we will use here the broad brush stroke definition 
of gendered qualities articulated by different voice feminism: men are associated with 
rules, enumerating duties, and individual ethics, while feminine qualities including sensi-
tivity to others, loyalty, responsibility, self-sacrifice, and peacemaking all reflect interper-
sonal involvement. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
THEORY AND WOMEN‘S DEVELOPMENT (1982). While this breakdown is simplistic, see Ange-
la P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1980), 
it provides a broad jumping-off point that continues to be echoed in popular discourse to 
this day. See also LOUANN BRIZENDINE, THE FEMALE BRAIN (2006) (arguing that women‘s 
brains are configured to render them more adept to social and group interactions). 
 195. In relation to civility as well, the Canons make a stronger case than the Model 
Code. Specifically, the Canons discuss the need for a ―respectful attitude‖ and expressly 
frown on using lawsuits to obtain funds from clients. See Final Report, supra note 18, at 
579 (Canons 1, 14). Lawyers are chastised for engaging in ―unseemly wrangling‖ as ―[a]ll 
personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided.‖ Id. at 580 (Canon 17). In 
questioning witnesses, the Canons caution against ―improper speech‖ and ―offensive per-
sonalities.‖ Id. at 580 (Canon 18); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
101 (1980) (requiring only generally at (A)(1) that lawyers ―avoid[] offensive tactics, [and] 
treat[] with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process‖).  
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vancement of funds to clients beyond specific circumstances relating to 
supporting the litigation.196 At no point is a lawyer permitted to give 
funds to a client outright, regardless of need.197 The Model Code and 
the current Model Rules fail to recognize a duty to provide emergency 
aid or need. In fact, the Model Code does not include an overall duty of 
a lawyer to communicate effectively with her client, although one rule 
requires that the client is notified of the receipt of assets,198 and there 
are several rules that regulate communications with those with ad-
verse interests as well as contact with witnesses, investigators, and 
the press.199 Communication in general is a skill which women are of-
ten viewed as excelling in.200 While today a ―duty to inform‖ a client is 
included in the Model Rules,201 this initial omission is noteworthy.  
 Perhaps more telling than what was included in the Model Code 
from the Canons is what was removed or downplayed. Specifically, 
the Model Code deemphasized community building and relationships 
at the bar, emotional consciousness, and civility, qualities easily as-
sociated with traditional ―feminine‖ qualities, despite the fact that 
these qualities are valued by clients.202 The exclusion of certain skills 
that were previously present in the Canons is particularly insightful 
given the Code generally greatly expanded, rather than limited, the 
Canons.203 The preface of the Model Code notes a main goal behind 
drafting new codes was to add ―important areas of conduct that were 
either only partially covered or totally omitted from the Canons‖ and 
observed that the Canons were ―sound in substance‖ but needed edi-
torial revision.204  
 As an initial matter, the Canons take a stronger view of the inter-
connected nature of the legal community and the duties of collegiali-
ty. The Canons expect lawyers to have loyalty to one another and an 
                                                                                                                  
 196. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B), EC 5-8 (1980). 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. at DR 9-102(B)(1) (―A lawyer shall: Promptly notify a client of the receipt of 
his funds, securities, or other properties.‖).  
 199. See id. at DR 7-104, DR 7-107-10.  
 200. See HELEN FISHER, THE FIRST SEX: THE NATURAL TALENTS OF WOMEN AND HOW 
THEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 57-83 (1999). 
 201. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (requiring under the title ―communica-
tion‖ in part B that ―[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation‖).  
 202. Ann Juergens, Valuing Small Firm and Solo Law Practice: Models for Expanding 
Service to Middle-Income Clients, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 113 (2012) (reporting re-
sults of a study of small firms and solo practitioners who served moderate-income clients, 
which found that the principal factors in lawyer success were relationship building, com-
munication, and collaboration with non-lawyers). 
 203. The Canons were originally only nine pages long, while the Model Code was over 
fifty pages long when it was first passed.  
 204. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Preface (1980). 
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overall sense of civility. For example, Canon II (7) states that even if 
a client would like assistance of additional counsel, ―[a] lawyer 
should decline association as colleague if it is objectionable to the 
original counsel.‖205 The Canons also outline how ―[e]fforts, direct or 
indirect, in any way to encroach upon the business of another lawyer 
are unworthy of those who should be brethren at the Bar.‖206 Howev-
er the Code makes no mention of such considerations nor of a duty of 
civility even in the broadest terms.  
 In compiling the necessary skills of lawyers, the Model Code also 
omits empathy and sympathy despite the fact that the Canons them-
selves outline specific instances mandating emotionally conscious 
actions. For example, the Canons admonish that an attorney should 
refrain from pushing trial forward where opposing counsel ―is under 
affliction or bereavement.‖207 The Canons also barred attempts to 
―curry favor‖ with jurors through ―fawning, flattery, or pretend solici-
tude.‖208 In the role of the advocate as articulated in the Model Code, 
there is no requirement to communicate or advise, taking into ac-
count the fear, anxiety, or general holistic state of one‘s client. This 
has ongoing repercussions. The bar‘s reticence to recognize as valid 
lawyer skills emotional intelligence and interpersonal aptitude has 
intensified over time as rules related to compassion have tightened209 
and even time-honored lawyerly traits with emotional resonance, 
such as zeal, have fallen into disfavor.210  
 Notably, the Model Code not only omitted certain qualities from 
the discussion of legal ethics—it also created new explicit duties. For 
the first time, a free standing duty of competence was articulated by 
designating a section of the Model Code under Canon 6 ―A Lawyer 
Should Represent a Client Competently.‖211 Competence is also refer-
enced in the first Canon of the Model Code, which states that ―[a] 
lawyer should assist in maintaining the integrity and competence of 
the legal profession.‖212 In the enforceable and binding disciplinary 
rules, the Model Code commanded as follows: 
                                                                                                                  
 205. Final Report, supra note 18, at 577 (Canon 7).  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 581 (Canon 24). 
 208. Id. at 581. 
 209. This element of the Code continues to this day in Model Rule 1.8, which subjects 
lawyers to discipline even if they provide money to clients for necessary, emergency, or 
vital non-legal expenses. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (2002). 
 210. For a more thorough discussion of the removal of zeal as a requirement over time, 
see Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165 (2006); Lawrence J. Vi-
lardo & Vincent E. Doyle III, Where Did the Zeal Go?, 38 LITIG. (No. 1) 1, 4 (2011). 
 211. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 6 (1980).  
 212. Id. at Canon 1.  
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A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or 
should know that he is not competent to handle, without associat-
ing with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. (2) Handle a 
legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances. 
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.213 
 Competence is defined in terms of substantive legal knowledge, 
preparation, and organization. It limited the ability of lawyers to 
take on cases in opposition to the existing bar, as practice in areas of 
law that were new to an attorney required an existing member of the 
bar to ―associate[e]‖ with the work. Generally, competence was not 
assessed by clients, peers, or by senior attorneys in a mentorship 
style environment. Instead, the competence revolution manifested in 
the first multistate bar exams in 1972, the requirement of attendance 
at ABA accredited schools in most jurisdictions, compulsory bar 
membership with ongoing fees, and ongoing legal education require-
ments. Competence did not include emotional intelligence, negotiation 
skills, substantive knowledge of the community being served, commu-
nication skills, or demonstrations of substantive writing skills.  
 The Wright Committee made clear that competence was added to 
the Model Code as a measure for screening lawyers, arguing that 
―standards must be established to exclude people from admission to 
the bar who could not, or are not likely to, serve clients capably and 
well‖214 The inclusion of a competence duty as defined and imple-
mented erected a barrier to entry to the legal profession and a means 
to remove bar licensing. In particular, competence was highlighted as 
being of central importance to all parties, ―only if all persons have 
access to the law, which requires that they have access to lawyers of 
integrity and competence,‖ will government be that ―of laws, not of 
men.‖215 This distinction is particularly meaningful given the historic 
context of the Code‘s drafting, when the issue of adherence to law 
had very real consequences in terms of support or lack of support for 
acts of civil disobedience. Committee Chairman Wright also articu-
lated a more self-serving rationale: that misconduct by individuals 
would reflect badly on all lawyers and the judicial system.216  
                                                                                                                  
 213. Id. at DR 6-101(A)(1-3).  
 214. Wright, supra note 10, at 9. 
 215. Id. at 7.  
 216. See id. at 8 (―Lawyers are the face of our legal system that laymen most often see; 
the impressions that laymen have of our legal system are often in large measure by their 
impressions of lawyers.‖). 
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4.   Day to Day Practice: Limited Lawyer’s Roles, Limited Lawyers 
and Their Clients 
 Divesting lawyers of broader social and moral responsibility beyond 
client service limits the lawyer‘s role in playing a unique and influen-
tial part in civil society. This limited role of lawyers may dispropor-
tionally impact socially disenfranchised individuals who become law-
yers. The divestment of broader societal power from the attorney‘s role 
generally has a particularly acute impact for attorneys who do not 
have other means to access influence. These lawyers must use their 
education and professional status to impact causes they favor, as op-
posed to lawyers who are wealthy, well connected, or have other ave-
nues for gaining influence. The limitation of the lawyer‘s role may also 
mean that some of the most educated and privileged members of a mi-
nority group (those who have law degrees) may be substantially lim-
ited in their ability to act politically through their work.  
 The neutral-partisan dominant ethos may discourage lawyers who 
are politically or morally motivated to become lawyers from joining 
the bar, since the neutral-partisan model of lawyering does not ex-
pect them to act upon their convictions. Likewise, it may also in-
crease in the relative strength of the amoral lawyering contingent of 
the bar skews the legal profession away from even discretionary ex-
ercises of lawyer moral autonomy.217 To a certain extent, the bar is 
self-selected: people who find the neutral-partisan ideal appealing 
are attracted to the practice of law. Likewise, the inverse is also true; 
those attracted to the practice of law to engage with broader issues of 
justice and morality are likely to be repelled. When these people con-
sider or attend law school the ―dominant view‖ sends the message 
that such views of a lawyer‘s role are fringe and bordering on unpro-
fessional and that neutral-partisan client service is the central and 
perhaps only legitimate goal of lawyering.  
 The neutral-partisan limited role of lawyers also quiets the voices 
of lawyers who serve disenfranchised clients. The dominant ethos left 
                                                                                                                  
 217. In the discretionary spirit of the work of Bill Simon, the current Model Rules do 
allow for certain discretionary exercises of morality but do not compel lawyers to act under 
these circumstances. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2013) (providing for 
disclosures pursuant to all exceptions to attorney duty of confidentiality, including those 
related to serious harms to third parties and those that are discretionary); id. at R. 1.16(b) 
(providing that lawyers may, under the right circumstances, withdraw from the represen-
tation where they have serious moral objections); id. at R. 2.1 (providing that lawyers may 
advise client on extra-legal concerns including ―moral economic, social and political factors‖ 
relevant to a client‘s case); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1083 (1988). However, the discretionary exercise of lawyer morality does not elimi-
nate imbedded issues regarding ambiguity and pervasive norms of practice as well as the 
toll that the neutral-partisan baseline takes on both lawyers and the public perception of 
lawyers.  
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in place under a standard conception regime is one that limits lawyer 
autonomy to a very narrow bandwidth—essentially rendering a law-
yer‘s legitimate exercise of power in society as coterminous with that 
of clients. Therefore, lawyers who have powerful and sophisticated 
clients will also have broad power in society and leeway to pursue 
long-term legal goals and strategies. As repeat players, clients who 
are already sophisticated enough to comprehend and utilize the pow-
er of the law for societal influence can seek incremental structural 
change that is to their benefit. However, these clients do not need 
neutral partisanship to protect their autonomy; they are informed 
and have ample means to use market forces to curtail and shape 
lawyer behavior. On the other hand, lawyers with disenfranchised 
clients are comparatively limited. Clients from disenfranchised 
groups may not have the material means to set aside immediate re-
lief in favor of developing long-term interests. Therefore, a system 
which does not set lawyer moral integration as a baseline leaves 
broad civic and moral issues almost exclusively to those who already 
have considerable social influence by virtue of their legal sophistica-
tion and wealth.  
 5.   Discussion, Dissent, and Homogeneity: The Value of Pluralism  
 Somewhat ironically, amoral lawyering seeks to facilitate individ-
ual rights, equality, and diversity in American society by attempting 
to eradicate a plurality of views at the bar, leaving a neutral conduit 
for clients‘ pluralistic views/agendas. There is a certain democratiza-
tion element here, if one believes, as was the case in the mid-sixties, 
that clients were the common people and lawyers represented the 
elite. However, the bar is larger and much more diversified today. In 
many lawyer-client relationships the client is more ―elite‖ than the 
lawyer. In this context, a system in a democratic society that seeks to 
impose a false sense of homogeneity for the purpose of avoiding ideo-
logical conflict is fundamentally misguided. Ideological conflict and 
dialogue across difference is necessary and important to a function-
ing democracy. It is not to be avoided or quashed, particularly in a 
forum, such as law practice, with a strong pedagogical purpose and 
highly visible role in society.  
 Neutral partisanship buys at a heavy price the peaceable coexist-
ence of lawyers and clients with whom they have a moral disconnect. 
To the extent that pluralism has value in American society, it must 
actually exist in the public space and be predicated on open differ-
ence, not concealment. Disagreement, discomfort, and discourse are 
necessary and beneficial to the growth of American democracy and to 
the development of just laws. Because of this, attempting to eradicate 
difference through ―neutrality‖ may also be immoral. If the bar truly 
seeks to protect diversity and equality (moral goals according to the 
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modern apostles of neutral partisans), then legal ethical guidance 
cannot seek an ideal where lawyers behave as though they were a 
homogenous group when they are not, and should not be. Rather, 
peaceful coexistence despite difference is wrong if it is predicated on 
fabricating and imposing homogeneity.  
 Morally valid pluralism requires disagreement, not avoidance. 
Disagreement, as in ―factions,‖ is useful and necessary in a democra-
cy to allow all parties a fair hearing, impede rash and unjust action, 
and make incremental steps towards the development of morally 
worthy law.218 This is as true in a civil action as in the voting process. 
The process of having civil discussions encourages competition of ide-
as and forces established thought to continually be reexamined, test-
ed, and improved. Homogeneity allows ideas and power to stagnate 
and threatens the stability and legitimacy of a democracy.219 Howev-
er, difference must be open, apparent, and discussed for its value to 
be realized.  
 Lawyers act as civic teachers to their clients, explaining how the 
American system of justice is supposed to work, what civic obliga-
tions are, and how to engage in civil discourse across differences.220 
Clients can educate lawyers about how law is actually working on the 
ground and present their own moral views. Clients and lawyers, spe-
cifically, and society at large, benefit from lawyers and clients engag-
ing in discussions of morality and the law.221 The current system ab-
breviates both the client‘s moral input and the lawyer‘s.222 By requir-
ing moral dialogue before selecting and seeking an outcome, the pro-
fession sends the reassuring message to clients and attorneys that 
morality does have a place in the consideration of law, supporting the 
legitimacy of legal institutions. Lawyers can feel pride in working 
towards a cause they believe in, and for an institution that values 
forthright conversation. The attorney client relationship would flour-
                                                                                                                  
 218. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (stat-
ing that factions are a necessary means of protecting minority interests: ―Different inter-
ests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common 
interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.‖). 
 219. Arguments in favor of the valor of difference play out more often in the literature 
related to market economies, where homogeneity is seen as stifling agency, innovation, and 
creativity. 
 220. See generally Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must Begin at 
Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207, 
1235-37 (2009) (arguing that, at a minimum, lawyers have a duty to discuss ideals of civic 
duty and virtue with clients). 
 221. See LUBAN, supra note 128, at 38 (arguing that the discovery of moral differences 
need not end the attorney-client relationship and proposing a different ideal of a ―law prac-
tice in which the lawyer who disagrees with the morality or justice of a client‘s ends does 
not simply terminate the relationship, but tries to influence the client for the better‖). 
 222. See Pepper, supra note 11, at 630. 
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ish as lawyers have conversations with their clients that are not 
steeped in knowledge inequalities; both client and lawyer have equal 
claim to moral expertise (which may well be none).  
 Because lawyers are in a unique position to understand the com-
plexity of the law, it is vitally important for our society to have law-
yers interact and examine the law applying their ordinary moral 
compass.223 The only time this becomes a problem is if we assume, as 
Stephen Pepper does, that lawyers share a monolithic and elitist 
sense of values. Thus, the problem in this model of lawyering is not 
the application of ordinary values to legal representation or laws, but 
the application of a limited subgroup‘s ordinary values to these en-
terprises. In this way, moral legitimacy is intimately intertwined 
with diversifying the legal profession. However, for the reasons dis-
cussed earlier, the system as it stands fails to encourage the inclu-
sion of divergent moral dialogue.  
 A general culture of dissent and discussion among the bar and 
their clients enfranchises citizenry. It combats unnecessary lawyer 
paternalism and legitimates government institutions. The sense that 
different voices will be heard encourages a culture of debate, partici-
pation, and investment in the project of governance. Compelling role 
integration, rather than differentiation for lawyers, adds actual 
transparency to the social structure of society, the attorney-client re-
lationship, and the legal profession as a whole.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article took on three key questions to understanding modern 
legal ethics and the current law regulating lawyers: (1) When did 
lawyers stop discussing professional conduct in the workplace in 
moral terms? (2) Why was that choice made? (3) What are the fail-
ings and current impacts of that choice? As to the first point, this Ar-
ticle argues that the advent of the 1969 Model Code marked a break 
in the marriage between the ideas of professional conduct and role 
integration. In explaining this shift, the Article draws on historical 
sources and textual analysis to make the argument that the choice to 
limit moral agency was one grounded in a pragmatic need to facili-
tate a certain view of pluralism.  Finally, the remainder of the Article 
outlines how the advantages of neutral partisanship in terms of plu-
ralism (as defined by its advocates) fail in many respects.  
 The Model Code and subsequent professional norms are vestiges 
of a charged historical moment, a moment in which the language of 
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may be the only parties who know of the complex apparatus of law in a given area and its 
ramifications. 
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difference was nascent and theoretical understanding of diversity, 
equality, and individual rights was underdeveloped. In that context, 
even well intentioned parties could perceive a commitment to divorc-
ing ethics from professional conduct and justifying neutral partisan-
ship as moral, based on a flawed conception of how to facilitate equal-
ity and plurality.  
 Yet lawyers, as a profession, continue to plow forward without 
taking into account that historic moment, the tensions inherent in 
that moment, and the missteps taken in accordance with those early 
misconceptions of facilitating change, equality, and pluralism at the 
bar. In creating a code that incorporates latent bias, delegitimizes the 
discussion of broad ethical themes, and undermines lawyer individu-
alism by adopting a homogenizing neutral-partisan ideal, the Model 
Code fundamentally undermined meaningful long-term pluralism, 
legal ethics, and the profession as a whole. 
 Today, the legal profession and modern legal ethics continue to 
struggle with the historic legacies built deep into the doctrinal and 
normative framework of the Model Code. Setting aside moral dis-
course among lawyers in service of demographic pluralism and adopt-
ing neutral partisanship was a poor trade, grounded in fundamental 
theoretical misconceptions of what neutrality and pluralism require. 
Adopting neutral partisanship as the ―standard conception‖ of law-
yering prevented, rather than enabled, the meaningful inclusion of 
the values of new entrants to the bar and solidified an ideal of law-
yers that is dehumanizing. Neutral partisanship limits all lawyers‘ 
ability to legitimately articulate their moral judgment, differing 
viewpoints, and unique experiences in the workplace.  
 The story here is not one of calculated malevolence. The architects 
of the Model Code were reasonable people drafting what appeared at 
the time to be a sensible plan to respond to a changing professional 
landscape. But these drafters were limited by the scope of their per-
sonal experiences and historical context. Their limitations need not 
be ours. 
